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This article treats both plagiarism in academic life and the recent
Supreme Court case of Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp.1 It reaches the conclusion that recognition of reverse passing
off is unnecessary for U.S. compliance with the Berne Convention. 2
Before confronting these multiple issues, however, some groundwork
is necessary. To begin the journey, the reader's indulgence is begged






RE: PRINCESS OF EG9PT
Bob,
'The 25th anniversary of your debut film, C AIGLA, is coming up next year.
1iough most of the world m~ght not be marking this landmark anniversary, its de-
1. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
2. As the discussion progresses, it will enumerate various species of moral rights, and refer to
them frequently. For ease of reference back, those rights are previewed here:
(a) the right'to be known as the author of her work;
(b) the right to prevent others from falsely attributing to her the authorship of a work
that she has not in fact written;
(c) the right to prevent others from being named as the author of her work;
(d) the right to publish a work anonymously or pseudonymously, as well as the right to
change her mind at a later date and claim authorship under her own name;
(e) the right to prevent others from using the work or the author's name in such a way
as to reflect adversely on her professional standing;
(f) integrity right;
(g) first publication right; and
(h) retraction right.
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votedjfolowers could think of nothing better than afolow-up project. In this spirit,





We begin in a picturesque Greek village. Periander (Perny) is mourning the foss of
his wife, Melissa. Unwilling to let her go, he proceeds to have sex with her corpse.
Metissa's ghost is not amused. She refuses to reveal to her husband the pace
where onty she knows a hidden treasure is buried-unless, that is, he makes amends.
As a result, Perry orders adt the women in town-rich and poor, free and save, young
and old-to march in a procession up to the local temple. Once there, he forces all of
them to strip naked and offer their clothes to his dead wife. The screen is fitted with
masses of naked women. [Lots of close-ups, natch.]
AcT I - THE W5IL EMPIRE
After the audience becomes familiar with our Greek setting, we move to Uzbeki-
stan. The great King Cyrus is arraying the mghty Persian army against the incompe-
tent locals. He stages an elaborate bacchanal to give them hangovers (and worse).
But the local queen, Tomyrus, irritated at her son's death, charges in and staughters
aft the invaders. She severs Cyrus' head and dunks it repeatedy in a wine barrel (or
is it a bag of blood?), all the whie huring imprecations at it. [Stop action here.]
With Cyrus dead, teadershipfaffs to his eldest son, Cambyses. Camby is not alto-
gether the traditionatfamiy man-as we learn at the outset, when he intimidates
the Persian judiciary into atlowing him to marny his full sisters. [The camera detais
the consummations, but tastefutty.] qhen, he hears from an oracle that Smerdis witt
soon be ruting in his stead. As a result, he sends a trusted advisor to secretly kitt his
brother, Smerdis.
Because Camby is also manifesting other sgns of instabiity and has taken an
extended eave of absence in Egypt, a tocal e-con takes over and assumes the role of
king. Ptie ex-con was previously mutilatedfor his crimes on Camby's order, by having
his ears cut off. [Flashback to show the punishment.] The pretender sequesters the
kig's harem and sleeps with each and every one of the royal wives. [Montage.]
Incidentally, his name also happens to be Smerdis.
Camby reatizes that the orace is coming true and that "Smerdis" is indeed occupy-
ing the throne-ony it happens to be not his brother Smerdis, whom he now realizes
was needessty murdered! In grief, Camby confesses to the Persian court that he
ordered his brother to be k~iled. No one believes him, given how crazy he has been
acting of tate, and that by this time word has reached them that "Smerdis" is actuay
sitting on the throne anyway.
2004]
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Pie bigest industrialist in the realm, Otanes (0T), decides to investigate in order
to safeguard his holdings. O.T previousfy married off his daughter to Camby, so she
is stiff ensconced in the harem, which is now under Smerdis' control O.T sends a
message to his daughter asking her if her new husband is indeed the royal Smerdis,
son of Cyrus, or some ruffian upstart. She sends word back that she never met the
royafSmerdis, so she does not know. O.T sends another message asking her to make
inquiry of her feffow wife, Atossa, who is sister to Smerdis and Camby, and therefore
wouldsurey know whether the new king is her own brother or his usurper. Phis time
the daughter sends back a message epfaining that she has been segregated from aff
the other wives, so she cannot ask Atossa. Finaly, O.T sends a message to his
daughter telling her to feef the side of her husband's head during sex-f he lacks
ears, he is none other than the ex-con, whereas f he has ears, he is the reaf king. She
sends back a message eplaining that if she were to feel underneath her husband's
turban at the he(qht of passion, she would undoubtedy incur the death penaty. O.T
insists that she do it nonetheess, and she finds the means to obey.
So, after some frantic lovemaking lfaithfully recorded on camera], the daughter
feefs Smerdis' head, and indeed, finds no ears! Wordgets back to Camby's circfe that
there is indeed an interloper in their midst, thus setting the scene for a paface revolt.
Ultimately, a new king is seated, and a new princess takes her throne.
AcT H -
rhe scene switches to Egypt. Pharaoh is bankroffing a hjqh fiving out of the Royal
Treasury, which is ocated in a favorite pyramid. Phe onfy problem is that every few
weeks it seems like there is an unaccountable diminution of the Tiesaurus [who says
we're not cuftured? That's Greekfor "treasure-house"]. Toforestaffffurther poaching,
Pharaoh posts hordes of guards outside to make sure that no one can get in or out.
No one does.
It turns out, however, that the buifder of the pyramid, Ong since dead, included a
secret chamber in which a stone fit so peifectfy that after it is put back in place no
one can teff that it had been removed. Before his death, the buifder revealed the secret
passageway onfy to his two sons. Now, both of them are simply helping themselves
to riches whenever they want in order to maintain their debauched fifestye.
So, Pharaoh comes up with a new plan-he puts an ingenious trap into the Trea-
sure Room, which wilf inextricabfy entrap anyone who gets within its clutches. Sure
enough, the next time the brothers go on one of their nocturnal invasions of the
Thesaurus, one brother is trapped. Phe pair realizes that the caught brother cannot
escape and that f Pharaoh's guards find him there in the morning, they wiff not only
execute him, but hunt down his brother. he trapped one therefore pleads that his
own head should be cut off and taken away so that the other brother may live. Pie
brother obfiges. [We see every detail]
Phe next day Pharaoh's troops find the treasure-house in peifect shape-except,
that is, for a headless corpse located in the trap! Everyone is nonplused to say the
[Vol. 54:1
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east. Obviously, the intruder had outside help. But who? Pharaoh commands that
the corpse be hung up in the pubic square to be eaten by the birds so as to humiliate
the robber's famify into reveaing themselves.
Phe pair's mother sees her son's corpse and goes crazy. Regardess of the fact that
her other son will be executed if she blabs, she is on the verge of spitting the beans in
order to save her son's corpse from further desecration. A plan has to be devised.
qe remaining brother saddes up his ass with wine and wanders in the market-
pace past the dangling corpse. There, an "accident" causes the wine to burst and to
spit! onto the sidewalk. Phe passing guards laugh as they tiberally help themselves to
the cascading liquid, all of which uttimately runs off. Predictabty, the guards attfall
aseep from this itte prank thus allowing the tiving brother to steal the corpse away
and save it from further gnominy. For good measure, he shaves rude messages into
the beards and hair of the king's sleeping battation.
Now, Pharaoh has been bested twice and he is hopping mad. He orders his daugh-
ter, who is a complete bombshe, to hetp him sotve the mystery by adopting the
fottowing stratagem: she should offer to sleep with any and atd comers, provided only
that they tet! her in bed the most daring expoits they have ever committed qhe king
instructs his daughter that when she hears the story of the robbery of Pharaoh's
treasury or the stealing of the body she shoufd grab hod of that man's arm and
scream until the guards arrive.
qhere ffows copious lovemaking and many ribad tales. [A movie within a movie,
heavy on the sex.] Into the tine comes our erstwhile hero. He has his pleasure with
Pharaoh's daughter and then proceeds to tell her the futl story of the disappearing
rock built into the treasury, how his brother got caught there, how he cut off his
brother's head, and how he staged the "wine accident" to later retrieve the corpse.
Phe daughter grabs the arm with all her strength and screams bloody murder. Noth-
ing can induce her to etgo, so she stiff has a firm grasp on it when all of the guards
surround the darkened bedroom and rush in.
Phe ony problem is that the trickster has been one step ahead of her-he antici-
pated what she woud do, so he took the precaution of bringing a spare arm (his dead
brother's, one imagines) to her boudoir-which is what the guards find her holing
onto when they finaty burst into the royal chamber.
At this point, Pharaoh has been bested three times, so he knWws that there is no
one smarter in the realm to lead Egypt than this man. He proclaims that the trickster
wit! become the new king and marry the bombshet! daughter.
qie stage is thus set for the titanic clash between the two princesses, Persia vs.
Egypt. P-hat sets us up for our seque, to complete the triogy. A treatment for that
instalment wit! be forthcoming (after I finish negotiations with a Southern Hemi-
sphere nation which is interested in being the locale for our production).
END END END END END END END END END END END
2004]
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II. To PREVENT THE TRACES OF HUMAN EVENTS FROM BEING
ERASED BY TIME
A. Three Scenarios
Our subject matter juxtaposes legal rights and moral rights in attri-
bution, inquiring into the wisdom of copyright protection in the aca-
demic context. To inaugurate the discussion, three scenarios
illuminate various aspects of the matter under examination.
1.
Consider first the above treatment for Feuding Princesses. Imagine
that it is made into a major motion picture, with screen credit solely in
the name of Shady Screenwriter.
Disclosure should be made that every name, every incident, and
every relationship set forth in that treatment is copied from an earlier
source. What Shady Screenwriter lacks in originality, he makes up for
in classical erudition. The source for everything contained in the
treatment is Herodotus,3 the father of history.4 The Histories, written
in about 440 B.C.E., records not only those few accounts excerpted in
that treatment, but also countless other details of antiquity.
Has there been a legal violation through omission of Herodotus'
name? A moral violation? How does this initial scenario affect our
inquiry?
2.
When Bobbi Kwall extended the kind invitation to me to partici-
pate as the 2003 Niro Scavonne Haller & Niro Distinguished Lec-
turer,5 she asked me to submit the title for my remarks. In response, I
excerpted the introduction from The Histories:
Here are presented the results of the enquiry carried out by Herod-
otus of Halicarnassus. The purpose is to prevent the traces of
human events from being erased by time, and to preserve the fame
of important and remarkable achievements produced by both
3. My primary source herein is the Oxford version of HERODOTUS, THE HISTORIES (Robin
Waterfield trans., Oxford ed. 1998) (commentary by Carolyn Dewald). I thank my teacher, Prof.
Dewald, not only for her gift of that volume to me with her inscription in Greek, but also for her
valuable insights in our discussions about Herodotus.
4. See Carolyn Dewald, Introduction to HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at xxi (title coined by Cic-
ero for Herodotus has stuck). Though I have been able to steer terminology away from the
paternocentric in the context of the moral rights discussed below, I am not attempting to rework
Cicero's language into "the parent of history." See infra text accompanying note 56.
5. David Nimmer, 2003 Niro Scavonne Haller & Niro Distinguished Lecture (Apr. 3, 2003).
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Greeks and non-Greeks; among the matters covered is, in particu-
lar, the cause of the hostilities between Greeks and non-Greeks. 6
I informed Bobbi that the title of my talk would be: To Prevent The
Traces Of Human Events From Being Erased By Time. She replied
that I should instead discuss academic writing. I told her that my re-
marks would not slight that arena. Moral rights, I added, would figure
prominently in the investigation.
The lovely brochure produced for the conference features my name
prominently. It presents the title as: Prevent The Traces Of Human
Events From Being Erased By Time: A Discourse on Academic Writ-
ing.7 Close, but not exactly the way I styled it.
Has there been a legal violation of my rights through the use of my
name in conjunction with a title that I did not explicitly approve? A
moral violation? How does this second scenario affect our inquiry?
3.
A friend of mine is on the legal staff of the Regents of the Univer-
sity of California. 8 Her duties recently brought her to my own institu-
tion, UCLA Law School. A colleague reviewing a student paper
noticed its eerie resemblance to an obscure monograph that had been
published years earlier. He brought the student up on plagiarism
charges.
Putting aside the issues of requisite due process and what the appro-
priate punishment should be, let us focus on the substantive defense:
The student claimed that "his research practice was to take notes into
his laptop, then cut and paste passages in writing the paper."9 He
"admitted that his work was 'fast and loose,' but denied that he had
committed plagiarism." 10 In other words, the student admitted that
large chunks of his article stemmed from another, which he
downloaded for research purposes and, when combining his own
thoughts with the work of others, which he meant to indent to show its
derivation from a previous source."1 But careless formatting over the
6. HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at 3.
7. See Nimmer, supra note 5.
8. My friend is Cynthia Vroom, who ultimately prevailed on behalf of the defendant in
Viriyapanthu v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. B157836, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8748,
at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2003).
9. Viriyapanthu, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8748, at *3.
10. Id.
11. This situation is not uncommon:
She took extensive notes on the articles she read, not realizing that her notes were
verbatim. Then she copied over the notes in the course of organizing the material to
write the paper. By the time she began drafting, she had lost track of what words were
hers and which were the words of her sources.
2004]
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course of multiple drafts obscured his original purpose, he averred.
The professor was not buying it. To that last defense, he might have
retorted, your unoriginal purpose, you mean.' 2
Has there been a legal violation of rights in this third instance? A
moral violation? Again, how does this affect our inquiry into aca-
demic copyright issues?
B. Traces of Human Events
Herodotus was not the first person to record human events. Ionian
raconteurs such as Hecataeus of Miletus (whom Herodotus often
cites) preceded him.13 But Herodotus was the first to progress from
being a traveling savant to a comprehensive chronicler, showing his
audience the linkage between disparate events 14 as a way of explicat-
ing the underlying root "cause of the hostilities between Greeks and
non-Greeks. ' 15 As such, I nominate him as "progenitor of academ-
ics"-not to mention precursor to every analysis that one reads in the
newspaper today (substituting for "Greek" in his phrase "the cause of
hostilities between Greeks and non-Greeks," depending on your
choice, "Westerners," "Americans," "Moslems," "Israelis," or what
have you). All that, and he managed to compose the whole without
footnotes!16
With the passage of millennia since his composition of the history of
the Persian War, we now have a set view of "history."'1 7 But writing at
the discipline's dawn, Herodotus used the term in its root sense of
"research" or "investigation.' 8 He would be the first to acknowledge
Lisa G. Lerman, Misattribution in Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism, Ghostwriting, and Authorship,
42 S. TEX. L. REV. 467, 489 (2001). See also infra note 402.
12. For contradictory meanings of the term "original," see David Nimmer, Copyright in the
Dead Sea Scrolls, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1, 193-96 (2001).
13. Dewald, Introduction to HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at xii.
14. Id. at xxii.
15. HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at 3.
16. See Dewald, Introduction to HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at xxii. Nonetheless, he achieved
a parallel effect: "Authorial cross-references dot the Histories, sometimes to passages at consid-
erable remove." HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at 604. See also Carolyn Dewald, Narrative Surface
and Authorial Voice in Herodotus' Histories, 20 ARETHUSA 147, 156 (1987) [hereinafter Dewald,
Narrative] ("[S]ome of his interventions as a critic ... can be rationalized as ancient equivalents
of the modern-day footnote: the author's sotto voce assurances that what the third-person text
presents is seriously researched and dependable evidence.").
17. As I write these words, nothing seems as vital to current events as an appropriate appreci-
ation of history. Though the locus has changed from Persia next door to Mesopotamia, about
the only thing that supporters and detractors of the latest war in the Gulf can agree upon would
probably be the proposition that "if there's one thing that we have learned from history, it's that
we have learned nothing from history."
18. See Dewald, Introduction to HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at xxvii.
[Vol. 54:1
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that his findings were provisional,1 9 and subject to reinterpretation by
future scholars. (Admittedly, however, not all of his observations
would pass current standards of composition outlined by the Ameri-
can Historical Association: "Patarbemis approached Amasis and is-
sued the king's command, but Amasis, who happened to be on
horseback at the time, lifted himself up in the saddle, farted, and told
him to take that back to Apries.") 20 Moreover, unlike the Biblical
narrator who peeks behind the curtain to reveal the divine plan,2' or
Homer who equally shifts the scene to the gods' machinations,2 2 the
histor is resolutely empirical 23 (indeed, avowedly secular)24 in what he
reports. 25 Religion figures into it, to be sure-but only (with few ex-
ceptions) 26 insofar as the important and remarkable achievements of
the individuals about whom he reports are themselves swept into re-
19. "I am obliged to record the things I am told, but I am certainly not required to believe
them-this remark may be taken to apply to the whole of my account." HERODOTUS, supra note
3, at 7.152, at 457. See id. at 2.123, at 144. No less than forty-one times he expresses outright
disbelief in the matters that he is recording. Dewald, Narrative, supra note 16, at 163.
20. HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at 2.162, at 161. But cf JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 222 F.
Supp. 2d 1030, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("If imitation is the highest form of flattery, can flatulence
be far behind?"). For a scholarly unpacking of Patarbemis' "windy response," see LESLIE
KURKE, COINS, BODIES, GAMES, AND GOLD 92 (1999).
21. That phenomenon begins with Gen. 1:1.
22. A goddess likewise appears by the third word of The Iliad. In Book Four, Athena inter-
venes to spoil a truce; in Book Five, Aphrodite saves one mortal, is wounded by another, and
calls on Apollo for relief. Throughout, Zeus, Hera, and Poseidon are regular interveners in the
affairs of men.
23. This is not to deny the existence of remarkable philosophical gems strewn along the path.
An example comes at the beginning:
I will cover minor and major human settlements equally, because most of those which
were important in the past have diminished in significance by now, and those which
were great in my own time were small in times past. I will mention both equally be-
cause I know that human happiness never remains long in the same place.
HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at 1.5, at 5. See also id. at 2.173, at 165 ("Anyone who is serious all
the time and never allows himself a fair measure of relaxation will imperceptibly slide into mad-
ness or at least have a stroke.").
24. "Because I believe that everyone is equal in terms of religious knowledge, I do not see any
point in relating anything I was told about the gods, except their names alone." Id. at 2.3, at 96.
"[I]f I were to explain why some animals are allowed to roam free, as sacred creatures, my
account would be bound to discuss issues pertaining to the gods, and I am doing my best to avoid
relating such things." Id. at 2.65, at 121.
25. See generally Dewald, Narrative, supra note 16.
26. "In my opinion, this was because the gods were arranging things so that in their annihila-
tion the Trojans might make it completely clear to others that the severity of a crime is matched
by the severity of the ensuing punishment at the gods' hands. That is my view, at any rate."
HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at 2.120, at 141. Towards the very end of his Histories, Herodotus
allows that there "is plenty of convincing evidence that the divine plays a part in human affairs."
Id. at 9.100, at 581.
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ligious undercurrents.2 7 He also does not shy away from expressing
an unpopular viewpoint. 28
The roots of copyright are not absent from The Histories.29 The
first murder recorded therein is commemorated "in a poem of iambic
trimeters. ' ' 30 The poet himself disclaimed gold and dominion; rather,
he wrote for the sheer joy of composition itself31 (thus removing him-
self far from the U.S. Constitution's rationale of legal protection in
order to stimulate authorship). 32 Shortly thereafter, Herodotus
records the birth of music, as Arion of Methymna composes a dithy-
ramb while being borne across the sea to Taenarum on the back of a
dolphin.33 People took their literature seriously in those days. When
a playwright wrote of the recent fall of Miletus, "the audience burst
into tears and fined him a thousand drachmas for reminding them of a
disaster that was so close to home; future productions of the play were
also banned. '34 Though himself progenitor of the recorded word, He-
rodotus is sometimes uncomfortable with the passage of oral culture. 35
Indeed, the histor at times associates writing with cleverness, "even
the excessive cleverness of tricks and tricksters. '36
27. "If I do refer to such matters, it will be because my account leaves me no choice." Id.
at 2.3, at 96. Herodotus is as interested in untrue accounts as in true accounts, to the extent that
the former had the capacity to inspire belief and actions among those whose history he recounts.
Dewald, Narrative, supra note 16, at 166.
28. "At this point I feel impelled to express an opinion which I am not going to keep to
myself, despite the fact that it will offend a great many people, because I believe it to be true."
HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at 7.139, at 451.
29. I even spotted one reference to "work for hire." Id. at 9.95, at 579. But that is overread-
ing, pure and simple. Cf JON D. LEVENSON, THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF THE BELOVED
SON 71-72 (1993) (condemning overreading of Gen. 4:3-4).
30. HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at 1.12, at 7.
31. Id. at 598.
32. "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful
Arts."' Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
33. HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at 1.23, at 11.
34. Id. at 6.21, at 359. The histor also very usefully traces the origin of the alphabet back to
the Phoenicians and comments on the history of writing. Id. at 5.58, at 324. There is also the
following poignant vignette, which looks like it could have been taken from today's news:
"[S]hortly before the sea battle, a roof collapsed on a group of children learning their letters, and
out of a hundred and twenty children only one survived." Id. at 6.27, at 361. The event evidently
so moved Herodotus that it shocked him from out of his normal secular detachment to remark
that there "are invariably warning signs given when disaster is going to overwhelm a community
or a race." Id. See also id. at 683 ("one of his rare personal comments on the pattern formed by
human events").
35. Dewald, Narrative, supra note 16, at 169 (showing how Herodotus was responsive to two
different thought worlds).
36. HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at 607. In addition, there is a danger that people who "take up
the cithara and the harp and [who] raise their sons to be retailers" will soon "become women
[Vol. 54:1
REVERSE PASSING OFF
To me, the fulcrum of the entire panorama is Demaratus, deposed
king of Sparta,37 who is given uncharacteristic access to an oracle
showing the ultimate demise of Xerxes. 38 Demaratus gets many of the
work's best lines:39
That's how the Lacedaemonians are: they're as good as anyone in
the world when it comes to fighting one on one, but they're the best
when it comes to fighting in groups. The point is that although
they're free, they're not entirely free: their master is the law, and
they're far more afraid of this than your men are of you. At any
rate, they do whatever the law commands, and its command never
changes. 40
When Spartans fight, they make "it plain to everyone, however, and
above all to the king himself, that although he had plenty of troops, he
did not have many men."'4' Demaratus gives Xerxes the only sound
advice the latter ever hears about how to win the Persian War.42 True
to form, the great king ignores the advice, with predictable results.
43
In the end, Demaratus associates poverty with political and military
success:"44 "There has never been a time when poverty was not a fac-
tor in the rearing of the Greeks, but their courage has been acquired
as a result of intelligence and the force of law."'
45
These interrelationships of poverty, law, and intelligence will recur
below in our investigation ("historie") of copyright laws and the
Academy.
instead of men." Id. at 1.155, at 69. For an extended exploration on the role of retailers in
archaic Greece, see KURKE, supra note 20, at 76, 146, 168. That author's tour de force places
retail trade in its place by recreating the mentalitds of Herodotus, through an examination of
"metals, prostitution, games, counterfeit language, and the counterfeit self." KURKE, supra note
20, at 25. See also id. at 25 n.63.
37. The name strikes me as ironic: Although the Lacedaemonians booted him out of their
territory, his name etymologically translates to "prayed for by the people." LIDDELL & SCOTT'S
INTERMEDIATE GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 182 (7th ed. 1889).
38. HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at 8.65, at 508. "There's no more terrible pain a man can
endure than to see clearly and be able to do nothing." Id. at 9.16, at 547.
39. Not only does he get great lines, but dashing assignments as well: Demartus' risky trans-
mission of a secret message from Susa, capital of Persia, all the way back to the Lacedaemonians,
relies on stealth and cryptography. Id. at 7.239, at 488.
40. Id. at 7.104, at 440.
41. Id. at 7.210, at 478.
42. Id. at 7.235, at 486.
43. HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at 7.237, at 487. See also id. Books Eight and Nine.
44. See id. at 735 (citing id. at 1.71, 7.102, 8.26, 9.82).
45. Id. at 7.102, at 439.
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III. MORAL RIGHTS4 6
A. Introduction
What are moral rights? The reference is not to utilitarian or deon-
tological calculations of right and wrong. Instead, that English phrase
translates the French phrase, le droit moral.47 "The adjective 'moral'
has no precise English equivalent, although 'spiritual,' 'non-economic'
and 'personal' convey something of the intended meaning. '48 These
Continental rights loomed large as a cautionary note in this country's
decision to join the Berne Convention. Much of the Berne Conven-
tion Implementation Act of 1988, 49 and its attendant legislative his-
tory, details efforts to hold the floodgates back from a full
Gallicization of moral rights in the United States. 50
1. Categorizing Moral Rights
In Continental conceptualization, what is le droit moral? Notwith-
standing that formulation in the singular, France5 l actually recognizes
numerous species of les droits moraux:52 First come several variations
on the droit d la paterniti (also called droit au respect du nom). When
46. Writing about plagiarism imbues one with hyperawareness of the need to cite sources. See
Laurie Stearns, Comment, Copy Wrong: Plagiarism, Process, Property, and the Law, 80 CAL.
L. REV. 513, 521 n.40 (1992) (citing THOMAS MALLON, STOLEN WORDS: FORAYS INTO THE
ORIGINS AND RAVAGES OF PLAGIARISM 125 (1989)): ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM AND
ORIGINALITY 218 (1952). In that spirit, one must guard even against self-plagiarism. Stearns,
supra, at 543-44 ("[it] becomes objectionable only when it results from laziness or the desire to
mislead"). Due acknowledgement must therefore be made that portions of the discussion below
derive from 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 8D.01-8D.02 (2004)
[hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]-not from laziness or a desire to mislead, but because that
is where I have previously discussed moral rights, and it is necessary to set the stage by re-
plowing some of that field for the discussion that follows. See infra note 353.
47. The Teutonic analog to this Gallic right is das Urheberpers6nlichkeitsrecht, or the "right
of the author's personality." See 1 STEPHEN PERICLES LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTEC-
TION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 575 n.2 (1938).
48. SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND AR-
TISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 456 (1987). See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, "Author-Stories": Nar-
rative's Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright's Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 24 (2001). See also infra note 131.
49. Act of Oct. 31, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853.
50. See H.R. REP. No. 100-609 (1988); S. REP. No. 100-352 (1988).
51. "The French and German systems regard moral rights as the heart and soul of copyright
law. To the Europeans, moral rights symbolize the author-oriented nature of their copyright
systems." Michael B. Gunlicks, A Balance of Interests: The Concordance of Copyright Law and
Moral Rights in the Worldwide Economy, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 601,
604 (2001). Note that a decision in Germany, "in 1912, ushered in the general acceptance of the
right of integrity in Europe." Id. at 646.
52. Note that even in France the plural has also crept in. See Andrd Lucas et al., France § 7, in
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (Paul E. Geller & Melville B. Nimmer eds.,
2003).
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Berne adherence was on the horizon, other commentators 53-and
even Congress itself 54-anglicized that term to "paternity right." De-
parting from universal usage, I chose the more gender-neutral term
55
"attribution" in writing up the Berne Convention Implementation Act
of 1988 for Nimmer on Copyright.5 6 It is gratifying to see that my
emendation has now become standard in cases 57 and commentaries.
5 8
In any event, the French droit d la paternitM can be conceptualized
along five planes:59
(a) the right to be known as the author of her work;
(b) the right to prevent others from falsely attributing to her the
authorship of a work that she has not in fact written;
(c) the right to prevent others from being named as the author of
her work;60
(d) the right to publish a work anonymously or pseudonymously, as
well as the right to change her mind at a later date and claim
authorship under her own name;61 and
53. See Final Report of Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention,
10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 552 n.19 (1986) [hereinafter Final Report]; RICKETSON, supra
note 48, at 456.
54. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 23, 33-35 (1988).
55. But see infra note 293.
56. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 8D.01 [A] n.8. If for nothing else, at least I
can claim credit (paternity?) for that innovation. (In the spirit of giving credit where it is due, I
must thank Dorothy Wolpert for reviewing my 1988 manuscript and suggesting excision of the
sexist term "paternity." A bit of cogitation brought to my mind the substitute "attribution.")
See Debora Halbert, Poaching and Plagiarizing. Property, Plagiarism, and Feminist Futures, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 111,
112 (Lisa Buranen & Alice M. Roy eds., 1999) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM].
57. See, e.g., Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing 3 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 8D.05).
58. See, e.g., Jaime S. Dursht, Note, Judicial Plagiarism: It May Be Fair Use but Is It Ethical?,
18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1253, 1280 & n.180 (1996) (citing 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.05).
59. See ANDRt LUCAS & HENRI-JACQUES LUCAS, TRAIT8 DE LA PROPRI8T8 LIrT8RAIRE ET
ARTISTIOUE §§ 401-410, at 327-33 (2001).
60. This particular right occupies less than a single sentence in Lucas et al., supra note 52,
§ 7[1][b]: "Third parties who delete the author's name or substitute their own for that name com-
mit an act making them liable for damages." Id. (emphasis added). See also LUCAS, supra note
59, § 402, at 327 ("r6tablir la vdrit6 en cas d'usurpation ou d'omission").
61. Obviously, any taxonomy of rights represents but one among many ways of dividing up a
field. The "right to disclaim anonymity" is probably congruent with the right to be known as
author of a work, corresponding to (a) above, and is also a function of the inalienability of moral
rights. As an example of the instant right,
in a case of a ghost writer employed in the United States, the Cour d'appel of Paris
enforced her right of attribution in France in the face of her contract waiving this right
to be named as author. Although the court found the contract to be both subject to
U.S. law and valid, it declined to give effect to any such waiver which, it considered,
would have been contrary to international ordre public, that is, public policy.
Lucas et al., supra note 52, § 7[4][a].
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
(e) the right to prevent others from using the work or the author's
name in such a way as to reflect adversely on her professional
standing.
In addition, there are other species of French moral rights:
(f) droit au respect de l'oeuvre, i.e., the right to prevent others from
making deforming changes in her work;62
(g) droit de divulgation, i.e., the right to publish a work or to with-
hold it from dissemination; 63 and
(h) droit de repentir or droit de retrait, i.e., the right to withdraw a
published work from distribution if it no longer represents the
views of the author.64
Under French law, the moral right is conceived as perpetual, inaliena-
ble, and imprescriptible. 65 In theory, therefore, even today in France,
an outrageous stage or film version of Le Mddecin Malgri Lui 66 could
be challenged and subjected to the full range of sanctions for violation
of the moral right. Moreover, even if Moli~re's 6 7 line has long since
expired in the three centuries since that play was penned, the French
state might still be able to protect the integrity right under what might
be termed (in Anglo-American parlance, at least) a parens patriae
theory.6 8
2. Moral Rights Under the Berne Convention
The Berne Convention, to which the United States has adhered
since 1989, does not by its own terms incorporate any droit de divulga-
tion or droit de repentir; accordingly, those aspects will largely drop
out from this study. But the treaty does command some recognition
for the droit d la paterniti and for the droit au respect de l'oeuvre.
Under Article 6bis, an "author shall have the right to claim authorship
of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modi-
fication of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work,
62. LUCAS, supra note 59, §§ 411-427, at 333-48.
63. Id. §§ 381-389, at 311-23.
64. Id. §§ 390-400, at 323-27.
65. Id. §§ 375-378, at 308-09 (also listing unseizability as incident of inalienability); Linda J.
Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1550 n.90 (1989); Moral Rights
in Our Copyrights Laws: Hearings on S. 1198 and S. 1253 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 163 (1989) (state-
ment of Ralph Oman).
66. MOLIERE, LE MDECIN MALGRr Lui (Larousse & Co. 1966) (1666).
67. Actually, "Moliere" was the nom de plume of Jean-Baptiste Poquelin-a nice instantiation
of moral right (d). Note that the author of Le M6decin Malgrg Lui himself did not escape the
label "un grand et habile picoreur." LINDEY, supra note 46, at 63.
68. RICKETSON, supra note 48, at 74.
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which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. ' 69 That right
must be accorded "[i]ndependently of the author's economic rights,
and even after the transfer of the said rights."
70
The framework set forth above divides the attribution right into five
prongs. 71 The language of the Berne Convention itself is much more
sparse, as it is limited to the author's right "to claim authorship of the
work." The semi-official guide published by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (which functions as secretariat of the Berne
Convention) elaborates that the intent is to recognize three branches
of the right: to assert that the author is the work's creator; to publish
anonymously or pseudonymously, with the option of later changing
his mind and abandoning anonymity; and to prevent use of his name
with reference to a work that he did not create.7 2 Those three rights
correspond to those labeled above respectively as (a), (d), and (b). 73
Turning to the omitted categories, the Guide makes no contention
that the Berne Convention itself implements an obligation as to (c).
Further, (e) is not incorporated into Berne's attribution right. None-
theless, that right-to prevent others from using the author's name
reflecting adversely on her professional standing-is itself a hybrid of
both the droit d la paternit6 and the droit au respect de l'oeuvre. As to
that latter right, called the "integrity right" in English, the same semi-
official Guide notes that it is "very elastic and leaves for a good deal
of latitude to the courts."'74 Accordingly, nations might or might not
choose to implement (e) as part of their own domestic schemes.
The Guide is not the only work that makes this point about diverg-
ing implementation across national boundaries. The moral rights pro-
69. Berne Convention (Paris Text), July 24, 1971, art. 6bis(l), available at http://www.supnite.
com/berne7l.htm.
70. Id.
71. See supra Part TII.A.1. For a review of all the moral rights, see supra note 2.
72. GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
WORKS 41 (1978) [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION]. Although the work was
published anonymously, the author of that commentary is Claude Masouy6, "whose right of
attribution is seldom recognized when the book is mentioned," as Daniel Gervais rightly noted
to me when reviewing this article.
73. See supra Part III.A.1. An eminent commentator on the Berne Convention is not in ac-
cord on this particular enumeration. Without citing sources, he maintains that Berne's paternity
right encompasses the affirmative right to attribution (a), the right to prevent use of another's
name (c), and the right for the author's name to appear legibly (an offshoot of (a)). See RICKET-
SON, supra note 48, at 467-68. Under this formulation, passing off (b) is excluded. Id. at 468.
Although that commentator is meticulous to cite the various interventions of national delegates
leading to the codification of moral rights in the Berne Convention and their appropriate inter-
pretation, id. at 456-67, 469-76, his discussion of the attribution right is uncharacteristically be-
reft of authority.
74. GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 42.
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vision of the Convention itself provides, "The means of redress for
safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be governed by
the legislation of the country where protection is claimed. '75 Further,
in another nod to local treatment, the Convention mandates that al-
though those rights must "be maintained, at least until the expiry of
the economic rights, '76 it requires no post-mortem recognition of
moral rights in countries whose internal law did not require such pro-
tection at the moment of ratifying the Berne Convention. 77
3. U.S. Recognition of Moral Rights
a. Prior to Berne Adherence
1.
A decade before U.S. accession to the Berne Convention, one court
stated, "American copyright law, as presently written, does not recog-
nize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since
the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal,
rights of authors. '78 Even on the eve of joining, Judge Easterbrook
derided "droit moral, the Continental principle" as a doctrine that "no
American jurisdiction follows as a general matter. ' 79
If we proceed through the catalog of moral rights set forth above,
that complete negation seems overstated. The French droit de divul-
gation, for instance, corresponds to the first publication right, which
the United States Supreme Court vindicated as an instance of the
75. Berne Convention (Paris Text), supra note 69, art. 6bis(3). A point of methodology arises:
Should reference be made to sources such as The Guide, or by contrast should the national laws
be consulted of those countries that incorporate the text of the Berne Convention into their
national laws in haec verba? The problem with the latter course of action is that application by a
court in the Netherlands, for example, leaves it impossible to distinguish between what arises
from that court's interpretation of the Berne Convention itself and what reflects its own Dutch
sensibilities. Cf. Neil Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on
TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 441, 453 (1997) ("By choosing instead to incorpo-
rate the Berne provisions by reference, placing them within the context of a trade instrument
that in many respects differs substantially from the Berne Convention, the drafters necessarily
tinctured Berne-in-TRIPS with a trade hue."). That problem is particularly pointed in this in-
stance, in which the treaty itself gives special latitude to "the legislation of the country where
protection is claimed." For those reasons, the instant analysis confines itself to abstract sources
of general import rather than the concrete decisions in individual nations.
76. Berne Convention (Paris Text), supra note 69, art. 6bis(2).
77. Id.
78. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976). For other like propositions, see
the cases collected in 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, §§ 8D.02[A], 8D.02[D][1].
79. Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1095 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987); see Justin Hughes, The
Line Between Work and Framework, Text and Context, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 32
n.54 (2001). As Judge Leval remarks, "Our copyright law has developed over hundreds of years
for a very different purpose and with rules and consequences that are incompatible with the droit
moral." Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1128 (1990).
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copyright owner's prerogatives (before U.S. adherence to the Berne
Convention) in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter-
prises.80 There, the Court addressed an unauthorized scoop of Presi-
dent Ford's forthcoming autobiography, A Time to Heal.81 So (g), at
least, has some vitality under U.S. law. But because it belongs to the
copyright owner rather than inalienably to the author, the U.S. instan-
tiation departs from the model prescribed by Article 6bis of subsisting
"[i]ndependently of the author's economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights."' 82 The droit au respect de l'oeuvre, to cite
another example, can be conceptualized as akin to the copyright
owner's right to prevent unauthorized adaptations to her work,83 rec-
ognized in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. 84 Now
(f) has been brought into the fold as well. 85 But different considera-
tions govern (h):
France's droit de retrait, by contrast, has largely been halted at the
border. Authors who have parted with copyright ownership and
thereafter recant their earlier works are powerless to extirpate cur-
rent dissemination of the views they now hold heretical. The closest
that U.S. law comes to a retraction right are those cases holding a
violation from purveying old works of an author accompanied by a
current photograph or other indicia tending to confuse the public
into believing that the work is in fact current. But those cases arise
out of misrepresentation, rather than an author's inherent right to
repent the literary excesses of his or her youth.
86
80. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). See Nimmer, supra note 12, at 153 n.754.
81. GERALD R. FORD, A TIME TO HEAL: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GERALD R. FORD (1st ed.
1983).
82. Berne Convention (Paris Text), supra note 69, art. 6bis(1). In other words, President Ford
owned the copyright in A Time to Heal at its composition, and therefore enjoyed the exclusive
right to put it into print. After he assigned the copyright, however, to Harper & Row Publishers,
then that entity owned the droit de divulgation. In this respect, U.S. law diverges from the Berne
Convention model. Although that departure will usually prove insubstantial in the case of the
instant droit de divulgation, opposing interests between authors and publishers can, at times, give
it great substance in the context of the droit au respect de l'oeuvre, for example. See infra note
84.
83. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000). See 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 8.09.
84. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). Expanding the point made supra note 82, it was only because
plaintiff in this case did not assign his work to the BBC for sublicensing to ABC that he could
maintain a cause of action. Had Monty Python parted with copyright ownership in its television
program, ABC could have edited it at will, without falling afoul of the adaptation right. For the
effect of the Supreme Court's opinion in Dastar v. Fox on Gilliam, see infra note 263.
85. Lest this arena be viewed as a backwater of the law, one must hasten to add that one of
the most celebrated cases of the last decade reasoned in part from Gilliam. The case in question
construed section 2 of the Sherman Act in evaluating the conduct of the largest software com-
pany in the nation. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
The court's invocation of Gilliam leads to most curious results, which are beyond the current
scope. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 8D.04[A][1].
86. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 8D.05[B] (footnotes omitted).
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One commentator also finds in the U.S. doctrine of termination of
transfers8" a limited retraction right, springing into action after pas-
sage of the requisite decades. 88
Turning now to the five prongs of the droit d la paternit6, an author
can insist that her publisher prominently display her name on the
book's cover and in all publicity; a recording artist can demand similar
treatment from his record company; and so on across the categories of
copyrightable works. 89 Therefore, (a) is no stranger to these shores.
Nonetheless, that right is not inalienable, as Berne seems to require:90
The generally prevailing view in this country under copyright law
has been that an author who sells or licenses her work does not have
an inherent right to be credited as author of the work. In line with
that general rule, it has been held not to infringe an author's copy-
right for one who is licensed to reproduce the work to omit the au-
thor's name.91
The same considerations apply to anonymity and pseudonymity;
that is, an author may require as a condition of her publishing contract
that her name be omitted, or that a pseudonym be used in its stead,
and even that she retain the right to alter that decision later. But ab-
sent such a contractual undertaking, once the publisher becomes
copyright owner, it can make the appropriate attribution decisions,
even over the author's objection. In short, (d) assimilates to the same
status as (a) in the United States.
Regardless of copyright ownership, no publisher can simply hijack
the name of a non-consenting author. It would constitute the tort of
passing off for Harper & Row, for instance, to reissue A Time to Heal
under the name Stephen King in order to boost sales (perhaps renam-
87. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c) (2000). See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, ch. 11.
88. See Gunlicks, supra note 51, at 648.
89. For simplicity, the discussion that follows addresses only book publishing; the same con-
siderations apply to other industries as well.
90. A contrary argument would conclude that these moral rights need not be inalienable even
under the Berne Convention. Article 6bis requires that its moral rights continue
"[i]ndependently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights."
On the other hand, it does not state that those moral rights must continue to belong to the
author "even after the transfer" of moral rights. Under this tight reading, after President Ford
has transferred all his economic rights to Harper & Row, he could continue to maintain a cause
of action against it for omitting his name from the cover, spine, and dust jacket of A Time to
Heal. But if Harper & Row obtained from him a perpetual waiver of his attribution right, then it
could maintain that he has no further rights to vindicate in the work, and that the language of
Article 6bis does not require otherwise. Such a claim is nonetheless dubious, given that the
"notion of independence is, of course, basic to the whole concept of moral rights." RICKETSON,
supra note 48, at 467.




ing it in the process to Erased by Time).92 Accordingly, (b) is proba-
bly the most robust of all moral rights under U.S. law. Turning to (c),
it invokes the opposite phenomenon: reverse passing off. The discus-
sion below treats that prong in detail. Finally, U.S. law recognizes no
overt doctrine whereby an author can prevent others from using the
work or the author's name in such a way as to reflect adversely on her
professional standing. 93 Nonetheless, it might be possible to vindicate
moral right (e) under extreme circumstances, such as where the sub-
ject utilization constituted libel or infliction of emotional distress. 94
ii.
Although the quick synopsis set forth above debunks the notion
that moral rights were utterly alien to the American zeitgeist prior to
Berne adherence, it also shows that U.S. law was then a good deal
removed from full-bore protection of le droit moral. Nonetheless, a
blue-ribbon commission, chartered by the State Department to study
Berne adherence, determined that U.S. law as it then stood was com-
patible with Convention requirements:
Given [i] the substantial protection now available for the real
equivalent of moral rights under statutory and common law in the
U.S., [ii] the lack of uniformity in protection of other Berne nations,
[iii] the absence of moral rights provisions in some of their copyright
laws, and [iv] the reservation of control over remedies to each
Berne Country, the protection of moral rights in the United States
is compatible with the Berne Convention. 95
That nuanced conclusion marshals numerous considerations. First
and foremost, it adverts to [i] equivalent doctrines whereby moral
rights find vindication under U.S. law. We return to that matter be-
low. Next, it invokes the practice of other nations as being not signifi-
cantly divergent from the U.S. experience (both [ii] and [iii]). Given
the experience of other common law jurisdictions, 96 and even civil law
92. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
93. For a poignant example of how a composer suffered through licensing of his song on a
motion picture soundtrack in a scene depicting child rape, see Kwall, supra note 48, at 36.
94. Such a claim seems highly doubtful. Nonetheless, there are seemingly no cases that plain-
tiffs refuse to file. In one illustrative example, plaintiff lost the Third Annual Rice Cook-Off
contest, but nonetheless found her recipe published. She responded by filing suit for "outrage;"
her husband joined in for "loss of consortium." See Griggs v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., 463 S.E.2d
608, 609 (S.C. 1995). In another, plaintiff alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress for
using his name as the terrorist character in a comic book. See Netzer v. Continuity Graphic
Assocs., 963 F. Supp. 1308, 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
95. See Final Report, supra note 53, at 547.
96. See David Vaver, Moral Rights Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 7 INT'L J.L. & INFO.
TECH. 270, 275 (2000) (debunking mythology that Canada often protects moral rights).
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countries, 97 that consideration might be well-taken, although it raises
the further question whether, as of today, countries like England-the
most prominent example cited to Congress in 1988 as a role model for
the lack of need to implement strong moral rights protection 98-have
augmented their moral rights protection during the interim in a way
that leaves the United States isolated.99 Finally, it relies on [iv] the
safeguard contained in the Berne Convention,100 granting member na-
tions leeway in their implementation of moral rights.
Returning to point [i], Congress concluded that U.S. law, as it then
stood, was in compliance with Berne's moral rights requirements.' 0'
For that purpose, it relied on a study that Professor Melville Nimmer
prepared in 1965-66.102 The blue-ribbon commission noted above
likewise cited at length from that study. 10 3 Although, admittedly, my
father stated there that "[i]t could be said that the United States does
comply with a narrow construction of the requirements of article
6bis,"' 104 he relied for that conclusion more on the lack of protection
among other Berne countries [iii] than on the breadth of United
States moral rights protection [i].105
97. Even such a supposedly high defender of moral rights as Germany does not necessarily
implement a wholly different vision of moral rights, as a practical matter, than does the United
States. A report prepared by the Copyright Office shortly after U.S. accession to Berne counts
the total number of moral rights cases involving motion pictures to arise in that country during
the preceding four decades. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, TECHNOLOGICAL ALTERATIONS TO
MOTION PICTURES 133 (1989). The total number "could be counted on one hand, while still
leaving adequate fingers free to eat a bratwurst." 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46,
§ 8D.02[1] n.54.
98. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 8D.02[D][2].
99. See Lionel Bently & William R. Cornish, United Kingdom, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 52, § 7.
100. See supra Part III.A.2.
101. H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 34.
102. Id. at 34 n.67 (citing Melville B. Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the
Berne Convention and the United States Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499 (1967)). Happily,
that author took me to Geneva during the year in which he prepared the report, and there
enrolled me in school where I learned French-thus laying the groundwork for me to later gain
an understanding of le droit moral. (Notwithstanding certain bumps of late in the Franco-Ameri-
can relationship that goes back more than two centuries, I particularly treasure the volume of
TRAIT8 DE LA PROPRIETIE LITrPRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE, supra note 59, that Andr6 Lucas in-
scribed for me: "A David Nimmer, le plus franqais des Californiens.").
103. Final Report, supra note 53, at 548-57.
104. Nimmer, supra note 102, at 522.
105. Id. at 523. See id. at 522 ("[A]Ithough a number of the so-called moral rights receive




As the analysis proceeds, we will attempt to determine whether
U.S. law complies with Berne Convention norms. 10 6 One possible ra-
tionale for defending U.S. non-compliance with the strictures of the
Berne Convention is that other nations are similarly deficient (corre-
sponding to point [iii] above). 10 7 That excuse, in my estimation,
fails. 10 8 An additional consideration that dovetails with the foregoing
is that the United States excepted article 6bis of the Berne Conven-
tion from enforcement under the TRIPS protocol.10 9 That considera-
tion as well casts doubt on the bona fides of the United States in world
copyright circles. 10
Instead, the proposition advanced below is not that the United
States may shirk any obligations that it undertook when adhering to
the Berne Convention. Rather, it is that the strictures of that Conven-
tion do not extend to the domain of reverse passing off. Accordingly,
the United States can hold its head high in international circles, even
as it deliberately declines to recognize legal protection for attribution
with respect to right (c) invoked above.11'
iv.
Among the cases cited by the blue-ribbon commission for the pro-
position that moral rights are not orphaned in the United States is
Smith v. Montoro." 2 That case introduced into the realm of works of
authorship the concept of reverse passing off," 3 which has been noted
106. See infra Part III.C.1.
107. See supra Part III.A.3.a.
108. The United States has joined the Berne Convention primarily for the sake of
moral leadership in the world copyright community. Yet by its minimalist approach,
the United States leaves itself open to the charge that it is failing to comply with some
very important Berne provisions. Prudential behavior dictates that, in order to reap the
benefits that flow from appearing to be moral, the U.S. must undertake activities that
will be perceived as moral. "The United States should not be perceived as imposing a
double standard on the rest of the world." That combination of self-interest and moral-
ity may well lead the United States to increase the measure of moral rights that it
accords. For it is morally questionable to proclaim one's moral leadership while failing
to accord clearly (as opposed to arguably) sufficient moral rights.
3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 8D.02[D][2] (emphasis in original) (footnotes
omitted).
109. See LucAs, supra note 59, § 365, at 302.
110. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 9A.06[C].
111. See supra note 2.
112. 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
113. Smith v. Montoro did not create the tort of reverse passing off; rather, it cited previous
cases for its ruling. See id. at 606, (citing John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292
(E.D. Penn. 1976), affd in relevant part sub nom, Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602 (3d
Cir. 1978)). Its innovation, instead, was to take that doctrine and apply it to the realm of works
2004]
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above as the instantiation of moral right (C): 1 1 4 "False identification of
another as author also may give rise to a claim by the actual author
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act." 115 In that case, the Ninth
Circuit granted relief to a film actor who found his name replaced in
the credits by that of a fictional actor-an intentional fabrication.
Analogizing to the substitution of a misleading trademark on physical
goods, the court found a violation outside of copyright law under the
Lanham Act.116 That decision paved the way for parties whose copy-
right claims failed to enter federal court nonetheless under the banner
of "reverse passing off."'1 17
Notwithstanding the existence of Smith v. Montoro and other cases
within the United States vindicating certain species of moral rights
under various circumstances, it is a stretch to maintain that the law in
the United States as of the enactment of the Berne Convention Imple-
mentation Act of 1988118 was congruent with Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention.119 Nonetheless, the Director General of the World Intel-
that traditionally found shelter under the copyright umbrella. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The
Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Sec-
tion 43(A), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 1004 (2002).
114. See supra Part III.A.1. For a quick enumeration of all the moral rights, see supra note 2.
115. Final Report, supra note 53, at 553 (citing Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir.
1981)).
116. Montoro, 648 F.2d at 605.
117. Id.
Trademark law has long and properly condemned ordinary "passing off"-when, for
example, a little-known
, 
"Brand X" watch manufacturer attaches the Rolex trademark
to its watches and passes them off as made by Rolex. In contrast, "reverse" passing off
would occur if the Brand X company bought genuine Rolex watches, took off the
Rolex mark, put its own name where Rolex's used to be, and sold the watches as
"Brand X." As the example suggests, the commercial temptation to engage in "re-
verse" passing off is slight-as is the harm it causes. "Reverse" passing off does not
directly threaten the reputation or sales of Rolex, because Rolex's name is not on the
watches. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 5 cmt. a (1995). Indeed the
practice is often harmless or even beneficial (as when Safeway buys Birdseye frozen
peas in bulk and markets them at a discount under its own private label).
Brief for Petitioner at *14, 2002 U.S. Briefs (LEXIS) 428, Dastar v. Fox, 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (No.
02-428) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. For more on this case, see infra Part III.B.
118. In a decision handed down the very week of enactment, the court initially noted that
moral rights as such are not part of U.S. law, but then recognized certain limited rights in the
author based on a combination of copyright, trademark, and contract law. Soc'y of Survivors of
the Riga Ghetto, Inc. v. Huttenbach, 535 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1988).
119. Elsewhere, I have contended that, at the time, protection of moral rights in the United
States was
significantly at odds with moral rights as enforced in countries that incorporate Article
6bis into their domestic laws in haec verba. At the outset, all U.S. creators working in
an employment relationship will, on account of that employment status, be most chal-
lenged to vindicate, under copyright law, any of the quasi-moral rights described below.
Ineligibility for employees to assert moral rights in their creations "is doubtless a legal
position which is incompatible with the protection provided for under Article 6bis of
2004] REVERSE PASSING OFF
lectual Property Organization explained to Congress that the various
member states of the Berne Union "ardently desire"12 0 U.S. accession
to the Convention "without qualification.'' 1 2 He further expressed
his "opinion that the United States may become a member of the
Berne Convention without making any changes to U.S. law for the
purposes of Article 6bis.' 122 The General's opinion may reflect more
[ii] and [iii] than [i]. Several European commentators overtly doubt
that he meant [i] (and maintain that, if he did, he was in error). 2 3
the Berne Convention." More broadly, consider a concrete example. In 1949, com-
poser Dmitri Shostakovich lost an action in New York for violation of his moral rights
through use of his music in a context to which he objected, namely an anti-Soviet film
entitled "The Iron Curtain." A parallel case in France against the same motion picture
studio produced a contrary result. The same year, the muralist of a New York church
unsuccessfully objected to painting over of his bare-chested Christ, which the parishio-
ners concluded "placed more emphasis on His physical attributes than on His spiritual
qualities." A French sculptor, by contrast, won substantial damages from the Com-
mune de Baixas for destruction of his portrayal of a woman wearing the local costume.
It is doubtful that, had those New York cases been brought in 1989 rather than 1949,
the results would have been different. In these and countless other particulars, there is
cause to question Congress' conclusion that American law as of 1989 recognized the
artist's right to object to "derogatory action in relation to" his work. Moreover, the fact
that the United States subsequently implemented moral rights legislation - expressly
limited to the very narrow category of works of visual art, and subject to innumerable
exceptions even in that field - merely highlights the contrast between our system and
that of other Berne states, whose moral rights apply across almost all categories of
copyrightable works.
3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 8D.02[D][1] (footnotes omitted). After canvassing
both sides of the debate, the conclusion reached there is that "the truth lies between the ex-
tremes. U.S. moral right protection is far from nonexistent. Yet it apparently fails to accord the
full-fledged protection contemplated by Article 6bis." Id. (footnote omitted).
120. U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 12 (1987) (state-
ment of Dr. Arpad Bogsch).
121. Id.
122. S. REP. No. 100-352, at 10. In that context, Dr. Bogsch adverted to section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, among other federal and state sources.
123. "In spite of the reassuring statements by Dr. Bogsch and the Senate Committee, it seems
to us that the protection of 'moral rights' in the USA fails to rise to the standards contemplated
by Art. 6bis." WILHELM NORDEMANN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING
RiGHTs LAW 86-87 (1990) (citing 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.02). Those professors con-
clude that Dr. Bogsch and the Senate Committee were inspired by "the universal desire-among
members of the Union as well as by American authors-that the USA should accede to the
Convention rather than by a close examination of the American law." Id. at 87. See Jane C.
Ginsburg, Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age in the United States?, 19 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 9, 10 (2001) (evaluating United States' claim to be Berne-compliant as of 1989 as "we
were lying").
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b. Ancillary to Joining the Berne Convention
i.
The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 expressly states
that U.S. law then in existence sufficed to comport with all the re-
quirements of the Berne Convention. 124 Article 6bis was foremost on
Congress's mind in that regard-fully a third of the enactment's thir-
teen sections are designed to forestall a claim that Berne adherence
creates a direct cause of action under U.S. law for the enforcement of
moral rights. 125 President Reagan likewise joined in that position.126
Meanwhile, "independently of Berne adherence,1' 27 Congress si-
multaneously considered augmenting moral rights in the United
States. The process ultimately culminated in the enactment of the Vis-
ual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA). 128 Three details about that
amendment to the Copyright Act are apropos:
* Protection under VARA is limited to works of visual art. Ex-
cluded thereunder are, inter alia, motion pictures and other
types of applied art. 12
9
" Even within the realm of visual art, only signed original or lim-
ited editions obtain protection. Accordingly, although that
amendment might make actionable cutting up the original can-
vas of a Picasso painting, 130 by contrast selling posters of a Pi-
casso painting emblazoned with mustaches or curse words added
by the poster-maker (or that render his blue phase hot pink)
escapes liability under VARA. Thus, "traditional copyright law
protects art; by contrast, VARA protects artifacts. 131
124. Act of Oct. 31, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, § 2(3).
125. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 1.12[A].
126. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 1623 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 1229 (1988) (letter from Ronald Reagan to Senate dated June 18,
1986). See also H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 30.
127. H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 40.
128. Act of Dec. 1, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, tit. VI. One commentator de-
murs from the entire enterprise: "The concept of the droit moral for artists is completely mis-
guided. It reveals a faulty appreciation of the relationship between artists, art work, and
audience." Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?, in Copy FIGHTS 67
(Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002). He derives from the Congressional testimony of
George Lucas, referring to film colorizers as "barbarians," that Mr. Lucas himself must be a
barbarian. Id. at 87 n.122.
129. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 8D.06[A][1].
130. Part of the impetus for Congress to pass this amendment was the outrageous case of "two
Australian entrepreneurs who cut Picasso's 'Trois Femmes' into hundreds of pieces and sold
them as 'original Picasso pieces."' H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 17 (1990).
131. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTr, supra note 46, § 8D.06[A][2]. It has been commented above
that le droit moral means a personal right, rather than a right derived from the strictures of
morality. See supra text accompanying note 48. Nonetheless, one court applying this law seem-
ingly viewed itself as a moral arbiter: Notwithstanding its denial of any legal cause of action
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* When it does apply, VARA accords an integrity right "to pre-
vent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification
of that work" 132 and "to prevent any destruction of a work of
recognized stature"'133 along with an attribution right in three
flavors:
_ "to claim authorship of that work;" 134
- "to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any
work of visual art which he or she did not create; '135 and
- "to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the
work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or
other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to
his or her honor or reputation. '136
The first two bullet points stand in sharp contrast to the type of moral
rights protection contemplated by Article 6bis of the Berne Conven-
tion, which applies across the board to movies, books, songs and all
other types of copyrightable subject matter, and to reproductions as
well as to the original artifact.1 37 About the last bullet point, it is in-
under the statute, it was moved to comment that although "plaintiff has failed to state a cause of
action under VARA," still the "carelessness of the employees in destroying Pollara's work was
utterly deplorable" and that the "defendant and his employees should be ashamed of their disre-
gard for the obvious skill, effort and care which Pollara put into her mural." Pollara v. Seymour,
206 F. Supp. 2d 333, 335 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). Note that unlike the sphere at issue in that case,
there is a domain in which moral rights attest to moral character. See infra text accompanying
note 449.
132. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2000).
133. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B). Query what impact this provision would have exerted on the builder
who unplugged a freezer in collector Charles Saatchi's kitchen, in which was stored a frozen
"blood sculpture made by Britart's enfant terrible, Marc Quinn" consisting of "Quinn's head
cast in nine pints of his own frozen, congealed blood." Angelique Chrisafis, Blood Sculpture
May Be Ruined, THE GUARDIAN, http://www.guardian.co.uk/arts/news/story/0,11711,749033,00.
html (July 4, 2002). Similar considerations apply to the oeuvre of Joseph Beuys. When a custo-
dian at the Dusseldorf Academy deposited Fettecke in the dustbin, it cost the state government
of Rhein-Westphalia $27,000 in damages-notwithstanding that the work itself consisted of five
kilograms of rancid fat and butter. See John Dornber, Where's the Grease?, 87 ART NEWS 13
(Mar. 1988); Godfrey Barker, Never Mind the Art, Just Feel the Wealth, THE ADVERTISER, July 6,
1989.
It was not the first calamity of its kind. In 1977, one of Beuys' most vital creations, a
baby bathbat spotted with sticking plaster, was inadvertently used as a beer cooler at a
museum party. No damage was done, but its integrity as a work of art was violated.
Id. (that episode cost the museum $104,166). Perhaps the explanation for Beuys' art comes from
the fact that as an "ardent Nazi pilot, five times wounded in the war, [he] was shot down in the
Luftwaffe JU-87 over the Russian steppes and was saved when itinerant Tartars wrapped his
frozen body in felt and fat." Id.
134. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (2000).
135. Id. § 106A(a)(1)(B).
136. Id. § 106A(a)(2).
137. Even the United States Supreme Court recognizes that "Section 106A is analogous to
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, but its
coverage is more limited." Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S.
135, 150 n.21 (1998).
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teresting to note which of the species of the droit d la paternit6 Con-
gress chose to implement. 38 The three types just noted correspond to
those moral rights denominated above respectively as (a), (b),
and (e). 13 9 Missing from Congress' enumeration are (c) and (d). 140
ii.
Moving away from VARA, the same month it passed Berne imple-
menting legislation, Congress also enacted the National Film Preser-
vation Act of 1988 (NFPA).141 The NFPA authorized the Library of
Congress to designate twenty-five films per year as "culturally, histori-
cally, or aesthetically significant." Such designated films, to the extent
they were materially altered-which includes colorization-had to in-
clude a conspicuous label alerting the public to the alteration. 142 As
evidenced by the Congressional finding in the NFPA's preamble that
"it is appropriate and necessary for the Federal Government to recog-
nize motion pictures as a significant American art form deserving of
protection," this law at least inclines in the direction of recognizing
that an interest exists in film integrity, consonant with the droit au
respect de l'oeuvre.143 Further, in requiring that the label warn the
public that the materially altered version of the work was being re-
leased without consent from the creative talent behind the film, it ac-
cords some recognition of the right to not have one's name associated
with a work for which one wishes to disclaim responsibility, consonant
with one aspect of the droit t la paternite. Nonetheless, the NFPA falls
far short of previous attempts to legislate true moral rights protection
for films, which failed because those attempts proved controversial. 144
138. One commentator avers that, even after the passage of VARA, "moral rights protection
in the United States lags woefully behind the protection afforded creators in most other coun-
tries." Roberta Kwal, Moral Rights for University Employees and Students: Can Educational
Institutions Do Better Than the U.S. Copyright Law?, 27 J.C. & U.L. 53, 55 (2000) (emphasis
added). Whether one accepts her adverbial characterization is a matter of perspective.
139. See supra Part III.A.1. For a review of the various branches of moral rights, see supra
note 2.
140. Note that the Guide to the Berne Convention opines that (d) is a necessary component of
treaty compliance. See supra text accompanying note 72.
141. Pub. L. No. 100-446, 102 Stat. 1774 (1988). See 2 U.S.C. § 178 (repealed 1992).
142. 102 Stat. at 1783.
143. 102 Stat. at 1782.
144. See 134 Cong. Rec. H3083 (daily ed. May 10, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier)
("the best course was to avoid statutory treatment of moral rights in the context of Berne. This
conclusion rested in part on the political reality that legislation with a moral rights provision
simply would not pass."); Eric J. Schwartz, The National Film Perservation Act of 1988: A Copy-
right Case Study in the Legislative Process, 36 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 138, 139 (1989) ("Ex-
cept for the creative artists involved (principally the Directors Guild of America), the legislative
strategy of all the other parties was to keep the issue of moral rights, or a least the inclusion
thereof, separate from the enabling legislation permitting United States adherence to the Berne
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Of course, it also cannot come close to the laws of those nations that
extend the integrity right to all movies, and to those that forbid
colorization rather than merely requiring disclaimer labels.145
In any event, that effort proved short-lived. Congress subsequently
repealed the NFPA and substituted in its place the National Film Pres-
ervation Act of 1992.146 The latter enactment followed the Register of
Copyright's preparation of a lengthy report concerning moral rights in
films, 14 7 culminating in a recommendation that Congress consider a
unified system of moral rights protection, or as an alternative, an ex-
pansion of moral rights limited to the motion picture industry. 148 Not-
withstanding those recommendations, Congress retreated in 1992
from according moral rights protection to films; 14 9 the 1992 law's focus
is limited to celluloid preservation. 150
c. Subsequent Developments
After Berne accession, legislation and litigation marched on.151 In
the former realm, Congress added strictures regarding something
called "copyright management information 1 152 in the context of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act;153 that domain touches on moral
rights, but is so convoluted 54 (as is the rest of that omnibus amend-
ment) 155 as to afford no straightforward augmentation of moral
Convention, in order to ensure that the controversy would not prevent the United States from
joining Berne.").
145. See Lucas et al., supra note 52, §§ 7[1][c][ii], 7[4][a] (French court enjoins showing of
colorized version of Asphalt Jungle following debate in Paris concerning colorization).
146. Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 273 (June 26, 1992).
147. See generally REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 97. The report canvasses such activi-
ties as colorizing, panning and scanning, time compression and lexiconning, all of which affect
film integrity.
148. Id. at 176-82.
149. S. REP. No. 102-194, at 9 (1991). See id. at 10 ("eliminates the labeling requirements of
the 1988 act").
150. 137 Cong. Rec. H1l, 261 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991) (statement of Rep. Moorhead). See 4
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 13.05[F][2] (recounting previous recognition in Copy-
right Act of need for film preservation).
151. Given the catalog of moral rights recognized under U.S. law through the close of the
twentieth century, it is erroneous to claim: "There have been cases in which moral rights crept
into the discourse of American law, but this was usually because the judges did not know what
they were doing." SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS 162 (2001).
152. 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000).
153. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28,
1998).
154. See DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT: SACRED TEXT, TECHNOLOGY AND THE DMCA 338-56
(2003).
155. Id. at 385-517.
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rights. 156 Case developments in the field of moral rights within the
United States, for the most part, continued in the old groove. Scat-
tered decisions continued to vindicate attribution rights157 and integ-
rity rights, 158 as well as other branches of moral rights. t 59 Courts
occasionally recognized160-but more often denied161 -protection
under VARA. But the anticipated floodgate of moral rights following
in Berne's wake did not come to pass. 162
In one salient respect, however, moral rights grew. The matter
under examination is Smith v. Montoro. From the issuance of that
decision in 1981, until the United States joined the Berne Convention
on March 1, 1989, applications of that precedent tended to deal with
questions of standing163 or other aspects of law unrelated to "reverse
156. "The interests protected by those categories of copyright management information are
redolent of moral rights. Yet the fact that the statute allows the copyright proprietor (and not the
author or any other interested individual) complete freedom to waive those categories of man-
agement information along with her own identity leads to the conclusion that section 1202 is not
designed to protect moral rights, albeit some of the interests that it serves run parallel to that
domain." 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 12A.10[B][2][a]. As an example, a "pub-
lisher who ex hypothesi owns the copyright to Thomas Pynchon's novels could consent to their
distribution over the Net under the name Danielle Steele. One who acts with the publisher's
permission thereby avoids all liability under Section 1202." Id. § 12A.10[B][2][a] n.65.
157. For a review of that case law, see 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 8D.03.
158. For a review of that case law, see id. § 8D.04.
159. For a review of that case law, see id. § 8D.05.
160. See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 982 F. Supp. 625, 636 (S.D. Ind. 1997), affd, 192 F.3d
608 (7th Cir. 1999); Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 528-30
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Pollara v. Seymour, 150 F. Supp. 2d 393 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), later opinion, 206 F.
Supp. 2d 333 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
161. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding lobby of hotel to
have been prepared as work for hire, hence outside of VARA protection); Peker v. Masters
Collection, 96 F. Supp. 2d 216, 222 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (VARA has no application to posters); Lee
v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 1997) (VARA does not proscribe mounting of art
reproductions onto tiles); Pavia v. 1120 Ave. of the Americas Assocs., 901 F. Supp. 620, 629
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (barring claim because it took place before VARA's enactment).
162. Before United States adherence to Berne, former Register of Copyrights David Ladd
testified to Congress on behalf of a coalition of publishers opposed to Berne accession:
[C]ourts faced with moral rights claims will in close cases likely look for guidance to
Berne and the laws of those nations that are far more familiar with the right mandated
by the Convention. Thus, there will be substantial pressure for the courts to expand the
moral right once recognized.
H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 35 (quoting Statement of David Ladd on behalf of the Coalition to
Preserve the American Copyright Tradition, before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Repre-
sentatives, Sept. 16, 1987), as published in Hearings on S. 1301 and S. 1971 Before Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyright and Trademarks of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. at 424 n.33 (1988). Subsequently, that coalition withdrew its objection to Berne adherence.
See 134 Cong. Rec. S14,558 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
163. See Tracy v. Skate Key, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 748, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Camel Hair & Cash-
mere Inst., Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1986); Thorn v. Reliance
Van Co., 736 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1984).
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passing off."1164 To the extent that reverse passing off rose to the fore,
most decisions during that interval refused to apply it.165 Nonetheless,
a few pre-Berne decisions picked up the Montoro banner and waved it
vigorously. 166 Still, in terms of actually applying 67 the Lanham Act
68
to works of authorship, only two such cases applied the doctrine of
reverse passing off, 16 9 of which only one case extended it.170
After Berne accession, though, Montoro went on steroids. Notwith-
standing an intervening amendment in the text of the Lanham Act
164. See Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1326 (2d Cir. 1989) (untimely assertion of
theory); Sims v. Blanchris, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 480, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (denying cause of action
under § 43(a)); Witco Chemical Corp. v. United States, 742 F.2d 615, 625 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (tax
case); Bear Creek Prods., Inc. v. Saleh, 643 F. Supp. 489, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (plaintiff failed to
show that case "arose under" the Lanham Act); U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 681 F.2d 1159,
1160 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding claim for false representation in comparative advertising cam-
paign under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act); Rickard v. Auto Publisher, Inc., 735 F.2d 450, 454
(11th Cir. 1984) (recognizing cause of action for traditional trademark infringement); Transgo,
Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1020 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding traditional
passing off claim): PPX Enters. v. Audiofidelity Enters., 818 F.2d 266, 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1987)
(Lanham Act violation for selling "eight albums purporting to contain feature performances by
Jimi Hendrix, but which either did not contain Hendrix performances at all or contained per-
formances in which Hendrix was merely a background performer or undifferentiated session
player.").
165. See Bd. of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 439 N.E.2d 526, 537 (11. App. Ct. 1982) (reserving
issue); Halicki v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987) (de-
nying extension of Montoro to complaint that plaintiff's film received "R" rating); Kamar Int'l,
Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1981) (expressing no opinion whether
Lanham Act was violated); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1984) (denying
as "meritless" claim that defendant copied "E.T." from plaintiff's work and then committed
reverse passing off); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 691 F.2d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 1982) (acknowl-
edging that reverse passing off exists for numbering system for replacement parts for the J-65 jet
engine, but reversing entry of preliminary injunction under facts presented).
166. See, e.g., By-Rite Distrib., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 577 F. Supp. 530, 541 (D. Utah 1983)
(recognizing reverse passing off in context of rival cola drink manufacturers).
. 167. But note the following dictum: "If CCNV reproduces 'Third World America' in any me-
dium and profits thereby, however, an accounting would be due to Reid as a copyright owner.
Independent of Reid's ownership of the copyright, CCNV might be obliged to credit Reid as an
author of the sculpture." Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (citations omitted), affd on other grounds, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
168. Other cases rely on it by analogy. See Soc'y of Survivors of the Riga Ghetto, Inc. v.
Huttenbach, 535 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1988) (holding party to contractual obliga-
tion to give credit); Meta-Film Assocs., Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1362 (C.D. Cal.
1984) (following Montoro by analogy when construing state law of unfair competition).
169. See R.H. Donnelley Corp. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 595 F. Supp. 1202, 1206 (N.D. I11. 1984)
("Under the rationale of... Montoro, IBT's failure to mention Donnelley's participation in the
publication of current Yellow Page directories constitutes a Lanham Act violation."); Lamothe
v. AtI. Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1988).
170. Lamothe recognized a Montoro tort for a truthful attribution of a song to two of its
composers, but omission of the names of two other composers. Id. at 1407 ("Had the defendants
decided to attribute authorship to a fictitious person, to the group 'RATT,' or to some other
person, this would be a false designation of origin. It seems to us no less 'false' to attribute
authorship to only one of several co-authors.").
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since that ruling had been handed down,171 courts began to apply
Montoro to construct a whole edifice of "creative credit" rules, some-
times so broad and vague as to place at risk all who copy works, even
from the public domain. Courts applied Montoro, for example, not
just to active misattributions, but also when a credit was simply omit-
ted,172 or when there were different points of view about how much
credit a particular contributor deserves. 173 The Second Circuit ap-
plied it not simply to cases of slavish copying, but also whenever a
defendant's work qualified as "substantially similar"'174 to the plain-
tiff's. 175 Courts even found themselves in the position of being asked
to rewrite television credits frame by frame, deciding how big each
should be, whether it should occupy the entire frame or share it with
other credits, and which credits should come at the beginning and
which at the end of the show. 176 In addition, a particularly pointed
application of reverse passing off came in Dastar v. Fox.
B. Dastar v. Fox
1. Background
History has a nice way of repeating itself.177 As already mentioned,
the United States Supreme Court addressed moral rights in the con-
text of President Ford's memoirs. 78 It is thus fitting that the memoirs
of another Republican president serve as the launching pad for the
Court's next foray into this field.179
171. The statutory language was amended under the Trademark Revision Act of 1988, effec-
tive November 16, 1989. See Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988). Even after the amend-
ment, the Ninth Circuit relied on its prior holding in Smith v. Montoro to characterize section
43(a) as creating two bases of liability: "false association" and "false advertising." Waits v. Frito-
Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1108 (9th Cir. 1992).
172. See, e.g., Schatt v. Curtis Mgmt. Group, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 902, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (de-
fendant published James Dean photo without crediting plaintiff).
173. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1237-38 (9th Cir. 2000) (allowing suit to decide
whether a contributor to Spike Lee's Malcolm X should be credited as a "co-writer" or an "Is-
lamic Technical Consultant").
174. That copyright term of art is itself one of the most slippery to apply in practice. See 4
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 13.03.
175. See Waldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 784 (2d Cir. 1994).
176. Paquette v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1286, 1287-88 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
177. Even putting aside Herodotus, consider the following precursor: "History plagiarized it-
self by bringing to our Supreme Court a dispute on the lines of" a prior one! BENJAMIN KAPLAN,
AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 26 (1966).
178. See supra Part III.A.3.a.
179. Going back even earlier, presidential papers are no stranger to copyright precedent. Jus-
tice Joseph Story's resolution of a seminal U.S. copyright case held in favor of one compiler of
George Washington's papers over a rival. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, No. 4901 (C.C.
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In 1948, General Dwight D. Eisenhower completed his memoirs of
World War II. The publisher, Doubleday, granted exclusive television
rights in the memoirs to Twentieth Century Fox, which in turn ar-
ranged for Time Inc. to produce a TV series based on the book. The
TV series, entitled Crusade in Europe, combined a soundtrack based
on the book with film footage from the United States Army, Navy,
and Coast Guard, the British Ministry of Information and War Office,
the National Film Board of Canada, and unidentified Newsreel Pool
Cameramen.
When the time came in the 1970s to renew its copyright in the TV
series, Fox failed to do so.1 80 A decade later, when videotapes swept
the American market, Fox realized that the failure to renew its copy-
right in the TV series was a blunder.1 81 Fox's cure was to reacquire
the television rights in the book-now including the right to produce a
videotape. Fox then granted SFM Entertainment the right to act as
sales agent and distributor of the videotape series. SFM spent $75,000
to locate, restore, and put the TV series on videotape. SFM gave New
Line Home Video a distribution license for the videotapes.
In 1995, Dastar decided to expand its music business to videotapes.
To capitalize on public interest in the fiftieth anniversary of the end of
World War II, it decided to utilize the public domain series, which its
principals recalled from their youth. Dastar learned that the 1948 TV
series was in the public domain, commercially purchased eight beta
cam tapes containing it, and copied large parts into a videotape series.
(It bears emphasis that what Dastar copied was the original (public
domain) version of the Crusade television series, not the New Line
video set.) It entitled the edited product World War II: Campaigns in
Europe. Dastar spent over $90,000 on its version and sold the seven-
tape boxed set for twenty-five dollars-substantially less than Fox's
version.
Dastar's version was a bit more than half as long as the television
series, and nearly an hour shorter than the New Line videocassettes.
Mass. 1841). Speaking of which, the first president himself was not above reverse passing off.
See LINDEY, supra note 46, at 223.
180. Doubleday did renew the book's copyright in its own name, claiming for the first time
that General Eisenhower composed his memoirs as a work for hire. A separate dispute in the
case revolves around whether that renewal was valid. See infra note 188.
181. Though not pretending to have concrete knowledge of what went through the minds of
Fox executives in the 1970s as to this particular title, I have more than once encountered situa-
tions in which motion picture studios of that era made the conscious decision to maximize reve-
nues in the current quarter, and hence knowingly declined to expend ten dollars to renew the
copyright of a twenty-eight-year-old motion picture that did not have any current prospect for
generating revenue (which encompassed old movies generally before the advent of videotape).
2004]
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Its product contained about thirty minutes of new footage, including a
new narrated opening title sequence and new narrated chapter head-
ing sequences. Dastar also modified the order of the footage it se-
lected from the television series. It created entirely new packaging
and a new title. Dastar's credits listed only Dastar and its staff who
produced the Dastar series; they did not mention Fox, New Line, or
SFM.
Fox, SFM, and New Line brought suit, charging Dastar with viola-
tions of the Copyright Act by infringing the copyright in General Ei-
senhower's book (not, of course, the expired copyright in the
television series). In an amended complaint, they added a claim for
violation of the Lanham Act, based on the listing of Dastar and its
personnel in the credits and the failure to mention Fox and the other
plaintiffs. 182 The failure to give credit, plaintiffs maintained, consti-
tuted reverse passing off under the Lanham Act.
The Central District of California granted summary judgment
against Dastar for both copyright infringement and reverse passing
off.1 83 On the latter, it held that, notwithstanding the differences be-
tween the two in content, packaging, design, and title, Dastar's series
was a "bodily appropriation" of the old Fox television series, and that
Dastar's failure to "credit" Fox, et al., violated the Lanham Act.18 4
The court awarded plaintiffs an amount equal to Dastar's profits from
its videos (approximately $784,000) and then doubled this award on
the ground that Dastar's violation of the Lanham Act was willful. 18 5
The resulting award substantially exceeded Dastar's entire gross reve-
nue from its videotape series (about $875,000).186
In an unpublished opinion, 187 the Ninth Circuit reversed the sum-
mary judgment for copyright infringement.1 88 However, it affirmed
182. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
183. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entertainment Distrib., No. CV-98-07189-FMC




187. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entertainment Distrib., Nos. 00-56703, 00-56712,
01-55027, 2002 WL 649087 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 2002). The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Kozin-
ski and Gould, plus Charles R. Breyer, United States District Judge for the Northern District of
California, sitting by designation. Id. The latter's brother recused himself from consideration of
the case at the Supreme Court level. See infra note 230.
188. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the copyright count for trial to determine
whether Doubleday had properly renewed the book's copyright. Thus, in the posture in which
the case arose to the Supreme Court, liability for reverse passing off had been sustained even
were it ultimately concluded that the work had no remaining copyright protection.
Separate from Supreme Court consideration, the district court held a later trial on remand
from the Ninth Circuit, at which point it reaffirmed its earlier summary judgment ruling that
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the ruling below for violation of the Lanham Act. The circuit court
concluded that Dastar was liable for reverse passing off because its
product bodily appropriated the television series without attribution.
The court found proof of likely confusion unnecessary "because the
bodily appropriation test subsumes the less demanding consumer con-
fusion standard." (I must confess to being far from a neutral observer,
as Dastar retained my services as part of its Supreme Court team after
its twin defeats at the district and appellate levels.) 89
2. Statutory Construction
a. Dastar's Argument
At the simplest level, Dastar v. Fox presents an issue of statutory
construction.' 90 Whatever might have been the merits of the Ninth
Circuit's construction of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act when it
handed down Smith v. Montoro in 1981, the more immediate question
is whether reverse passing off remains a viable cause of action since
Congress later revised the language of that section. 191 Although it
certainly had the opportunity to track Montoro's language in the
Doubleday properly renewed the book's copyright as a specially commissioned work for hire. In
an appeal currently pending before the Ninth Circuit, Dastar submits that the ruling contravenes
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
189. Credit belongs to the entire team representing Dastar at the Supreme Court level, in
which I am but a bit player: David Gerber, Stewart Baker, and Jane Wald. My contribution to
the brief was probably smallest among the four of us-which does not deter me from cribbing
portions of it where appropriate throughout this article. See infra note 353.
190. Blazing the scholarly path ultimately presented to the Supreme Court, by limiting con-
struction of the Lanham Act to consumer confusion rather than impinging on copyright law by
protecting authors, is Randolph Stuart Sergent, Building Reputational Capital: The Right of At-
tribution Under Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 45 (1994-95). The
author states, "The 'Right of Attribution' should be drawn narrowly to ensure that consumers
ultimately benefit from the additional protection given to producers." Id. at 49.
191. As amended via the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, section 43(a)(1) of the Lan-
ham Act provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or
false or misleading representation of fact, which -
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affilia-
tion, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteris-
tics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, ser-
vices, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be
damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
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Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Congress declined to do so.
Indeed, Congress considered and rejected a proposal to expand sec-
tion 43(a) to prohibit any "omission of material information. ' 192 It
rejected that suggestion because it "raised difficult questions [of] free-
dom of speech. 1 93 Representative Kastenmeier, the subcommittee
chairman responsible for the measure, made clear that, to avoid con-
stitutional difficulties, the newly amended section 43(a) "will extend
only to false and misleading statements of fact. ' 194
The statutory hook on which the lower courts in Dastar v. Fox hung
their analysis was the Lanham Act's prohibition of "false designation
of origin."'1 95 Those courts found Dastar liable based on both the
names it included in its videotape series (its own and its employees')
and those it omitted (Fox, SFM, and New Line). But Dastar and its
staff actually had every right to be treated as the origin of Dastar's
videotape series, whereas the three plaintiffs did not.
Beginning with Dastar's use of its own and its employees' names,
the inclusion of those credits in Dastar's videotape series was consis-
tent with the purposes of trademark law. Dastar both manufactured
and sold its videotape series and acted as the guarantor of its quality.
Under the Lanham Act, it was entitled to attach its name to the goods
to distinguish them "from those manufactured or sold by others and to
indicate the source of the goods."'1 96 Phrases such as "Dastar
Presents" and credits such as "executive producer" are not only un-
regulated by the Lanham Act but, if understood at all by consumers,
are not understood as making a claim of exclusive authorship, as is
shown by television productions like Charlton Heston Presents the Bi-
192. The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and
Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 435
(1987). In USTA's proposal, and in the bills originally introduced in both the House and the
Senate, "false designations of geographic origin" and "omissions of material information" were
both barred by the same subsection of the Lanham Act. See S. REP. No. 100-515, at 41 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603-04.
193. [Trademark] laws often raise difficult questions about freedom of speech. Dur-
ing the course of our consideration of this legislation, those difficult issues were raised
and sometimes hotly contested. I am pleased to say that the bill resolves those issues
satisfactorily, and that our important constitutional freedoms have been preserved.
The provisions on dilution, material omissions, and tarnishment and disparagement
that were originally proposed have been deleted ....
134 CONG. REc. H10, 411 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). The Senate
too attributed the deletion of the provision to "concerns that it could be misread to require that
all facts material to a consumer's decision to purchase a good or service be contained in each
advertisement." S. REP. No. 100-515, at 41, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5603.
194. 134 CONG. REC. H10, 411 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)).
195. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
196. Id. § 1127.
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ble. 197 Nor do consumers view a "producer" credit as designating au-
thorship; in fact, there appears to be an industry practice of awarding
"producer" credits to a wide variety of contributors, including "the
star's bodyguard and the investor's wife."' 198
Turning to the flip side, Fox, et al., were not the "origin" of Dastar's
videotape series. Three reasons counsel why no such obligation
should be read into the Lanham Act. First, that obligation would
thrust the Lanham Act into judgments about creative contributions,
which actually fall within the domain199 of copyright.200 Second, it
would impose on courts an obligation to compose credits for collabo-
rative works-a task that continues to baffle Hollywood professionals
after decades of effort.201 Finally, the formless moral rights created by
this definition of origin would supplant Congress's incremental ap-
197. See http://www.hestonbible.com (last visited June 6, 2004).
198. Producers Guild of America, Produced By Online, at http://www.producersguild.org/pg/
producedby/prod-rights.asp (quoting Robert Rehme, executive producer of Lost in Space and
Bless the Child) (last visited Feb. 11, 2003) (quoting Peter Samuelson, producer of Arlington
Road and The Gathering).
199. Allowing the Lanham Act to cross that boundary-to protect authors or inventors from
uncredited copying-would rewrite many of the Court's recent decisions. Under the Montoro
definition of origin, for example, Wal-Mart would not have been vindicated two years earlier;
instead, it would have been liable for selling "knockoff" copies of Samara Brothers' children's
clothing-because the copies did not credit Samara Brothers as the "origin" of Wal-Mart's cloth-
ing. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). Similarly, Bonito Boats
could have kept right on suing competitors who used molds to duplicate Bonito's unpatented
hulls-as long as Bonito sued to demand that each of their hulls identify Bonito as the "origin"
of the copied design. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). Feist
Publications, too, would have found itself back in court, charged not with copying a phone book
but with failing to provide an appropriate credit to Rural Telephone. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). Allowing such suits would contradict the Supreme Court's
"recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention
itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy." Bonito Boats Inc., 489 U.S. at 146.
200. The Copyright Act, which expressly distinguishes between a copyright and "any material
object in which the work is embodied," concerns itself with protecting the underlying creative
work of authorship. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000). Under the Lanham Act, by contrast, it is the goods
that determine who may use a trademark-the person who "manufactured or sold" the goods is
the "source of the goods" and may use a trademark to identify himself or herself. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (2000). See Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 463 (1893) (A trademark must be
"adopted for the purpose of identifying the origin or ownership of the article to which it is
attached, or... must point distinctively.., to the origin, manufacture, or ownership of the article
on which it is stamped. It must be designed ... to indicate the owner or producer of the com-
modity ....") (emphasis added).
201. The Writers Guild of America has negotiated twenty pages of rules for assigning a wide
variety of credits, from "written by" to "based on characters created by," and "from a Saturday
Evening Post Story by." But its rulebook is just the beginning. The rules must be interpreted,
and the Writers Guild has been forced to create an entire system of "credit" arbitration to apply
the rules. Disputes are common. In the four years between 1993 and 1997, over a third of all
films submitted for writers' credits-415 in all-ended up in arbitration. Robert W. Welkos,
Giving Credit Where It's Due, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1998, at Al. And even this elaborate system
has not kept disputes out of court. See Paquette v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 54
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proach to exactly the same issue, such as its explicit decisions to confer
limited rights on motion pictures via the NFPA, and to deny moral
rights for films under VARA. 20 2
Moreover, even if Fox, et al., could be considered the "origin" of
Dastar's videotape series, nonetheless Dastar did not make a "false
designation" of origin.20 3 The credits that the Ninth Circuit held omit-
ted consist of two screens in the Fox videotape series that display the
New Line and SFM logos without additional information, plus the
phrase "By Arrangement with 20th Century Fox. ' 204 But Dastar
could not have simply added those logos or that phrase to its own
series. Had it done so, it would have been justly accused of passing
off, i.e., of using "in commerce any word [or] name . . . which .. .is
likely to cause confusion ... as to the ... sponsorship, or approval of
his or her goods.., by another person. '205 SFM and New Line would
have objected that the presence of their logos could suggest that they
sponsored or approved Dastar's videotapes, 206 while Fox would have
objected that it had no "arrangement" with Dastar and that its reputa-
tion was being tarnished by association with a "mutilated '207 version
of the old television series.208 Lawsuits raising precisely such
U.S.P.Q.2d 1286, 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Writers Guild "created by" credit requires a supplemen-
tal "inspired by" credit).
Other entertainment guilds have also written collective bargaining agreements to govern cred-
its. The rules change from agreement to agreement and govern such details as "size and style of
type; color, speed, and legibility; the maximum number of credits for a specific contribution; the
wording of credits; and the relationship of one credit to another." 1 THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL.,
ENTERTAINMENT LAW: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES § 10.04, at 10-7 to 10-8 (2d
ed. 2002).
202. See supra Part III.A.3.b.
203. Dastar would be protected by the first amendment if it purchased a newspaper
ad to publicize its view that respondents are a gaggle of uncreative hacks whose "ori-
gin" claim is based entirely on their ability to write checks, mainly to lawyers. New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). If it expresses the same views in a
videotape that it has produced, however, it is subject to double damages and attorneys'
fees if after suit the court takes a more generous view of respondents' contributions.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 117, at *36.
204. Id. at *19.
205. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000).
206. See, e.g., Nintendo of Am. v. Dragon Pac. Int'l, 40 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994); Sega
Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 938 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Radio Today, Inc. v. Westwood
One, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 68, 73-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Presley's Estate v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339,
1366, 1377-78 (D.N.J. 1981).
207. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 23-25 (2d Cir. 1976) (ABC's broadcast
of a "mutilated" version of Monty Python violates Lanham Act); MxPx Global Enters. v. Tooth
& Nail Record Co., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1211, 1213 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (granting preliminary injunction
where defendant's release of album containing materially altered songs would suggest approval
by plaintiff rock band).
208. In theory, of course, Dastar could have drafted a new credit that identified the "origin"
role played by Fox, et al., while at the same time disclaiming any sponsorship or approval by
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"sponsorship" objections have become common.20 9
b. Position of the United States
At the Supreme Court level, the Solicitor General filed an amicus
curiae brief in support of Dastar.210 Explaining the "Interests of the
United States" in the case, the brief stated that the government "has a
substantial interest in ensuring that domestic law is consistent with the
United State's international obligations under the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, to
which the United States has acceded. '211 The brief addressed the
Berne Convention itself. 212 "In acceding to the Berne Convention,
Congress carefully considered the United States' obligations under
Article 6bis and concluded that the protections available under then-
existing domestic law, including the Lanham Act, were sufficient to
meet those obligations. '213 In support, the brief relied on a variety of
sources, including the report issued by the blue-ribbon commission
noted above, with its attendant citation to Smith v. Montoro.
214
Although reverse passing off generally does not present the classic
Lanham Act problems posed by direct passing off, lower courts
have concluded that certain types of reverse passing off may be pro-
scribed by Section 43(a).
Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981), is a path marking
case .... The Ninth Circuit's holding in Montoro is grounded in the
these parties. In practice, however, there is no way to draft such an alternative credit with any
confidence, for a hostile competitor like Fox can always find fault after the fact with whatever
Dastar says. Fox can object that the credit is too short and simple to do full justice to its originat-
ing role, or that the credit is too complicated for viewers to understand. It can complain that the
credit is more prominent than the disclaimer, and so gives too great an impression of sponsor-
ship, or it can object that the disclaimer is as prominent as the credit and thus hides Fox's vital
contribution in a sea of legalese. And, of course, whatever is said about Fox's role must also
satisfy the parties who preceded Fox-Time, Doubleday, Gen. Eisenhower, and the like. But
obtaining the consent of these parties in advance is highly unlikely. "Competition is deterred ...
not merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit." Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000). In these circumstances, Dastar's only practi-
cal choice was the one it made: leaving the credits out.
209. See Jim Jubinsky, Note, Copyright and Trademark: Are They Too Substantially Similar for
Literary Works?, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 389, 400 (1997) ("[D]efendants are placed in a 'catch
twenty-two' situation when it comes to accredidation .... [I]f the defendant does credit an
author and the author does not like it, or does not appreciate having his name associated with
the work, the original author could still claim a false designation of origin."). See also infra note
232.
210. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 2002 U.S. Briefs
(LEXIS) 428, Dastar v. Fox, 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (No. 02-428).
211. Id. at *1.
212. Id. at *9 (citing 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01).
213. Id. at *9.
214. Id. at *10 n.5.
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text of Section 43(a). As the court of appeals explained, "the Lan-
ham Act explicitly condemn[ed] false designations or representa-
tions in connection with 'any goods or services."' 648 F.2d at 605;
see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). At the time that Montoro was de-
cided, the Lanham Act did not require a plaintiff to show that re-
placing the star's name with an actor who did not appear in the film
was "likely to cause confusion" as to the "origin" of the film.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). But the court in
Montoro emphasized that a false designation about who starred in a
film is likely to affect how moviegoers perceived the nature or at-
tributes of the film.215
Although the Solicitor General did not state an overt position, the
government apparently wanted to safeguard the holding of Smith v.
Montoro, even if Dastar defeated liability under the Lanham Act.
The rationale for safeguarding that 1981 decision, although again not
overtly stated, presumably lay in safeguarding the treaty relations of
the United States. Having told the world that moral rights are pro-
tected on these shores, based in part on Montoro, the government
may have been concerned lest the United States be charged with go-
ing back on its word. In general, that concern is well taken.216 But as
specifically applied to safeguarding Montoro, the particulars of Berne
Convention jurisprudence actually allay the basis for the govern-
ment's fear, as wewill see below.217
3. Decision of the Court
a. Ruling
On June 2, 2003, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,218 marking the first
time 219 it considered the doctrine of reverse passing off.220 Starting221
215. Id. at *14-15.
216. In particular, it matches my own ruminations about the "moral ramifications" of U.S.
adherence to the Berne Convention. See supra Part III.A.3.a and note 108; infra note 271.
217. See infra Part III.C.1.
218. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
219. The previous month, a circuit court warned that there can be no tort of reverse passing
off when the purported miscreant who misattributed the work was also the only lost customer
potentially available to plaintiff. John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322
F.3d 26, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2003).
220. While Dastar v. Fox was wending its way through the courts, Fox Kids Europe Holdings
and Fox Latin American Channel argued to the Central District of California-the same juris-
diction in which Twentieth Century Fox had sued Dastar-that "a reverse passing off claim is not
tenable under the Lanham Act." Salim v. Lee, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1128 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The
district court denied that contention based on pre-Dastar law. Id. at 1128. Another court at the
same time allowed a reverse passing off claim to proceed against Michael Jackson, even though
plaintiff's construction made the Lanham Act redundant with Copyright Act allegations. Adams
v. Jackson, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1012 (N.D. Ind. 2002).
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with the observation that section 43(a) "does not have boundless ap-
plication as a remedy for unfair trade practices, '222 the opinion none-
theless noted that every circuit court to consider the issue has
construed that section as "broad enough to encompass reverse passing
off."'223 The Court readily agreed that under the statutory language,
Dastar would have made a "false designation of origin [that] is likely
to cause confusion ... as to the origin... [of its] goods" 2 2 4 had Dastar
simply "bought some of New Line's Crusade videotapes and merely
repackaged them as its own."'225 But it recognized simultaneously that
the actual facts in the case were
vastly different: [Dastar] took a creative work in the public do-
main-the Crusade television series-copied it, made modifications
(arguably minor), and produced its very own series of videotapes. If
"origin" refers only to the manufacturer or producer of the physical
"goods" that are made available to the public (in this case the vide-
otapes), Dastar was the origin. If, however, "origin" includes the
221. To drive the analysis, the Supreme Court laboriously cataloged the difference between
plaintiffs and defendants' products. The Court highlighted that Dastar copied "the original ver-
sion of the Crusade television series, which is in the public domain," rather than copying plain-
tiffs 1988 videotape version. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26. The Court continued its catalogue of
differences:
Dastar's Campaigns series is slightly more than half as long as the original Crusade
television series. Dastar substituted a new opening sequence, credit page, and final
closing for those of the Crusade television series; inserted new chapter-title sequences
and narrated chapter introductions; moved the "recap" in the Crusade television series
to the beginning and retitled it as a "preview"; and removed references to and images
of the book. Dastar created new packaging for its Campaigns series and (as already
noted) a new title.
Dastar manufactured and sold the Campaigns video set as its own product. The ad-
vertising states: "Produced and Distributed by: Entertainment Distributing" (which is
owned by Dastar), and makes no reference to the Crusade television series. Similarly,
the screen credits state "DASTAR CORP presents" and "an ENTERTAINMENT
DISTRIBUTING Production," and list as executive producer, producer, and associate
producer, employees of Dastar. The Campaigns videos themselves also make no refer-
ence to the Crusade television series, New Line's Crusade videotapes, or the book.
Dastar sells its Campaigns videos to Sam's Club, Costco, Best Buy, and other retailers
and mail-order companies for $25 per set, substantially less than New Line's video set.
Id. at 26-27 (citation to record omitted).
222. Id. at 29 (quoting Alfred Dunhill, Ltd. V. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir.
1974)). The Supreme Court further noted, "Because of its inherently limited wording, § 43(a)
can never be a federal 'codification' of the overall law of 'unfair competition."' Id. (quoting
Prof. McCarthy). By contrast, Smith v. Montoro implied that section 43(a) "has progressed far
beyond the old concept of fraudulent passing off, to encompass any form of competition or
selling which contravenes society's current concepts of 'fairness."' Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d
602, 604 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Prof. McCarthy).
223. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 30. In that context, the opinion cites Smith v. Montoro along with
decisions from four other circuits. Id.
224. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000).
225. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31.
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creator of the underlying work that Dastar copied, then someone
else (perhaps Fox) was the origin of Dastar's product. 2 26
Investigating the meaning of the implicated term in the Lanham Act,
the Court determined that
the most natural understanding of the "origin" of "goods"-the
source of wares-is the producer of the tangible product sold in the
marketplace, in this case the physical Campaigns videotape sold by
Dastar. The concept might be stretched ... to include not only the
actual producer, but also the trademark owner who commissioned
or assumed responsibility for ("stood behind") production of the
physical product. But as used in the Lanham Act, the phrase "ori-
gin of goods" is in our view incapable of connoting the person or
entity that originated the ideas or communications that "goods" em-
body or contain.227
The Court rejected different treatment for communicative products,
i.e., goods purchased not for their physical qualities but for their intel-
lectual content. 228 Such a proposal would bring the Lanham Act into
untenable conflict with copyright law.229
The Court reversed unanimously:230 Dastar was the "origin" of the
physical tapes that it sold, and accordingly committed no violation of
section 43(a). Any other construction would pose "serious practical
problems,"' 231 including presenting manufacturers with a Catch-222 3 2
in attempting to label their goods. 233 Emblematic of those problems is
226. Id.
227. Id. at 31-32 (parenthetical and footnote omitted).
228. Id. at 32.
229. Id. at 34. In International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), the
Court stated that "defendant's conduct differs from the ordinary case of unfair competition .in
trade principally in this that, instead of selling its own goods as those of complainant, it substi-
tutes misappropriation in the place of misrepresentation, and sells complainant's goods as its
own." Id. at 242. Dastar does not cite to that 1918 decision. But in the interim, it has largely
become a dead letter, outside of its own circumstances limited to purloining "hot news." See
generally NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
230. The vote was 8-0. Justice Breyer took no part in the case, inasmuch as his brother had
served on the Ninth Circuit panel below. See supra note 187.
231. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35.
232. In JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1961), the "catch" is that although insanity is grounds for
discharge from military service, anyone who applies to get out of the army ipso facto evidences
rational behavior, and hence cannot be insane. Courts and commentators typically invoke that
phrase without attribution (albeit not thereby incurring liability for reverse passing off!). See,
e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2002) ("The Court does not
accept that Congress would express its desire to do so by creating a confusing, self-contradictory
catch-22 situation."); supra note 209.
233. Dastar chose to excise Fox's name from its products-for which it found itself facing a
claim for reverse passing off. By contrast, had it included Fox's name on its edited version of the
original television series, then Fox more than likely would have filed suit under the Lanham Act
for passing off. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36. See also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46,
§ 8D.03[B].
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that the victorious parties below in this very case could only tenuously
claim to be the "origin" of the original television series.234 Indeed, the
Court elaborated at some length on the dangers of unmooring works
of authorship from copyright law:
Without a copyrighted work as the basepoint, the word "origin" has
no discernable limits. A video of the MGM film Carmen Jones, af-
ter its copyright has expired, would presumably require attribution
not just to MGM, but to Oscar Hammerstein II (who wrote the mu-
sical on which the film was based), to Georges Bizet (who wrote the
opera on which the musical was based), and to Prosper Merimee
(who wrote the novel on which the opera was based). In many
cases, figuring out who is in the line of "origin" would be no simple
task.... We do not think the Lanham Act requires this search for
the source of the Nile and all its tributaries.235
[Even a]ssuming for the sake of argument that Dastar's representa-
tion of itself as the "Producer" of its videos amounted to a represen-
tation that it originated the creative work conveyed by the videos,
allowing a cause of action under § 43(a) for that representation
would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the pub-
lic's "federal right to 'copy and to use,"' expired copyrights.236
This is not to say that Dastar v. Fox cuts off all forms of relief for rival
videotape sales. Most obviously, had Fox been diligent in renewing
the copyright to the television series, it would have been able to pre-
vail on the straightforward basis of copyright infringement.2 37 Moreo-
ver, as already noted, had Dastar sold products manufactured by Fox
with its own name substituted, it would have been liable for reverse
passing off.238 Finally, the Court's opinion construed only the "origin"
clause contained in the first paragraph of section 43(a); it therefore
remains possible for a party to fall afoul of the second paragraph of
234. Indeed, in the present case it is far from clear that respondents have that status.
Neither SFM nor New Line had anything to do with the production of the Crusade
television series-they merely were licensed to distribute the video version. While Fox
might have a claim to being in the line of origin, its involvement with the creation of the
television series was limited at best. Time, Inc., was the principal if not the exclusive
creator, albeit under arrangement with Fox. And of course it was neither Fox nor
Time, Inc., that shot the film used in the Crusade television series. Rather, that footage
came from the United States Army, Navy, and Coast Guard, the British Ministry of
Information and War Office, the National Film Board of Canada, and unidentified
"Newsreel Pool Cameramen." If anyone has a claim to being the original creator of the
material used in both the Crusade television series and the Campaigns videotapes, it
would be those groups, rather than Fox.
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35.
235. Id. at 35-36.
236. Id. at 34.
237. Id. at 38.
238. See supra text accompanying note 225.
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that provision by engaging in false advertising.239 One could imagine
Dastar itself falling.afoul of that provision, for instance, had it adver-
tised its videotapes as "containing all-new material never before re-
leased." 240 Since it actually said nothing of the sort, Dastar escaped
all Lanham Act liability under the Court's ruling.
b. Implications as to Moral Rights
Going beyond the parties to the suit, what are the implications of
the case as to the greater doctrine of moral rights in the United
States? In principle, there are three ways to read the Court's opin-
ion-narrowly, broadly, and in-between.
The narrow reading is that everything in the opinion is limited to
the particular subparagraph of the Lanham Act under which plaintiffs
filed suit, namely its "trademark" provision,2 41 meaning that the ruling
exerts no implication under the coordinate provision against "false ad-
vertising, '242 which was outside the complaint in suit.2 43 The implica-
tion would be that Fox itself could have prevailed against Dastar for
the conduct under review, if only its attorneys had framed their allega-
tions differently. 244 That reading reduces everything that the Court
said to a jejune exercise in pleading. In particular, it renders otiose
the Court's sweeping pronouncements as to "mutant copyright law" 245
and the like, and sets at naught its statement, "We do not think the
Lanham Act requires this search for the source of the Nile and all its
239. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000). See supra note 191.
240. Cf Benson v. Paul Winley Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (enjoining dis-
tribution of old recordings enclosed in album cover that would mislead consumers into believing
that it represented current work). The quotation in the text is invented, inasmuch as in the
actual case, by contrast, plaintiffs pursued no cause of action under this paragraph. See Dastar,
539 U.S. at 27-28. Certainly, it would seem that Dastar's actual conduct of calling itself the
"origin" of its product, given its specific blessing by the Court, could not serve as the basis of a
false advertising claim. See id. at 35-36. ("In many cases, figuring out who is in the line of
'origin' would be no simple task .... We do not think the Lanham Act requires this search for
the source of the Nile and all its tributaries.").
241. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000). For the quotation of the full statutory section, see
supra note 191.
242. Id. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
243. Thus, if Peter Plagiarist takes a poem written by Lauren Laureate, copies it ver-
batim, removes the author's name and inserts Peter's own name as author, there is
clearly a false statement of authorship. But there is no violation of Lanham Act
§43(a)(1)(A). And there will not be a violation of Lanham Act §43(a)(1)(B) unless, as
is doubtful, the purloined poem is used in "commercial advertising or promotion."
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:77.1
(2003).
244. In other words, plaintiffs in the case included a count in their complaint only under 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A), not under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
245. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34.
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tributaries. '2 46 Although it is too soon to track judicial application of
the Dastar precedent, my own prediction is that courts will not view
the decision as so limited.2 47
The broad reading is that the opinion negates any regulation by the
Lanham Act that is geared at works of authorship, rather than being
limited to the domain under review of reverse passing off.248 Under
this interpretation, the tort of authorial passing off (corresponding to
right (b) in the typology offered above)2 49 as well as reverse passing
off is no longer cognizable under federal law. The result would be
that a publisher could hire a hack to write a potboiler and proceed to
emblazon the resulting cover with the false legend "By John Grisham
and Stephen King, in an unprecedented collaboration." Against that
interpretation is the fact that Justice Scalia's opinion is careful to note
that Dastar would have exposed itself to liability had it engaged in
false advertising.250 The opinion thus evinces sensitivity for truth-in-
labeling. It is hard to imagine that the Court would have simultane-
ously discarded decades of construction of truth-in-labeling under the
Lanham Act insofar as it has condemned passing off. Certainly, noth-
ing in the opinion overtly inclines towards that earthquake. It is at
war, moreover, with the Court's observation that the flaw in plaintiffs'
allegations was stretching the Lanham Act "to cover matters that are
typically of no consequence to purchasers. '251 Given that the blatant
falsehood of claiming that a work was authored by Grisham and King
presumably would be of great consequence to purchasers, that broad
construction is problematic.
We are therefore left with the middle ground in interpreting the
Court's pronouncements. The opinion should be viewed as neither so
trivial as the narrow interpretation nor as implacably monumental as
the broad one. Rather, the Court's Dastar opinion about reverse pass-
ing off redefines precisely the law of reverse passing off. Its impact,
accordingly, centers around such previous cases as Smith v. Montoro.
The Ninth Circuit in that earlier case determined that "being accu-
rately credited for films in which they have played would seem to be
of critical importance in enabling actors to sell their . . . perform-
246. Id. at 35-36.
247. Early returns validate this prediction. See Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F.
Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Carroll v. Kahn, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1357 (N.D.N.Y. 2003);
Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith System Mfg. Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 969, 972 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
248. See David A. Gerber, Copyright Reigns-Supreme: Notes on Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp., 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1029 (2003).
249. See supra Part III.A.1; see also supra note 2.




ances. '' 252 That focus on the artist is consonant with the purpose of
copyright law. But it falls afield of the concerns of section 43(a), as
illustrated by Dastar:
The consumer who buys a branded product does not automatically
assume that the brand-name company is the same entity that came
up with the idea for the product, or designed the product-and typi-
cally does not care whether it is. The words of the Lanham Act
should not be stretched to cover matters that are typically of no
consequence to purchasers. 253
Insofar as the ruling of Smith v. Montoro focused on the adverse effect
suffered by an actor via the substitution of "Bob Spenser" for his
name (Paul Smith) in the credits for Convoy Buddies,254 it would ap-
pear to be a dead letter at present. Nonetheless, if the producers of
that film were to re-release it by falsely advertising "Tom Cruise and
Jennifer Lopez in Convoy Buddies," then proof that that billing was of
affirmative "consequence to purchasers" (a proposition not difficult to
imagine) would allow suit to proceed even in the post-Dastar era. 255
C. Evaluation
1. Does The Berne Convention Require Recognition of the Right to
Forestall Listing Credit for Non-Authors?
Given all the lead-up to moral rights in the United States premised
in the jurisprudence of the Berne Convention, 256 it is sobering to see
the way that the issue actually played out in the first pertinent case to
reach the Supreme Court. Apart from a passing question in oral argu-
ment,257 the issue failed to arise in Dastar v. Fox at all. Notwithstand-
ing the arguments urged to it about treaty compliance, 258 the Court in
its opinion deemed relevant only the positive statutes enacted by Con-
gress, rather than any representations that the government made
about U.S. treaty compliance. 259 Given the Court's conclusion that
252. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1981).
253. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32-33.
254. Montoro, 648 F.2d at 603.
255. I thank Tom McCarthy for elucidating the point to me.
256. See supra Part III.A.3.
257. In oral argument, Justice Ginsburg asked the Solicitor General about the relevance of the
Berne Convention to this case. Transcript of Oral Argument, 2003 U.S. Trans. (LEXIS) 35, at
*22, Dastar v. Fox, 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (No. 02-428) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument].
His brief answer was that that treaty "doesn't expand or reduce existing rights under ... domes-
tic law." Id.
258. See Brief Amici Curiae of the Directors Guild of America, Writers Guild of America et
al. in Support of Respondents, 2002 U.S. Briefs (LEXIS) 428, at *8-12, Dastar v. Fox, 539 U.S.
23 (2003) (No. 02-428).
259. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
[Vol. 54:1
2004] REVERSE PASSING OFF 45
the Lanham Act did not permit the subject cause of action, no further
room remained to rehabilitate it.
There is nonetheless one particular in which the Court confronted
the specific sphere of moral rights. Its decision recites the fact that
Congress passed VARA2 60 in order to confer affirmative rights to
claim attribution 26 1-but only in the circumscribed ambit of enumer-
ated artworks.262 That limited authorization undercut the notion that
Congress elsewhere afforded an open-ended right of the type contem-
plated by Smith v. Montoro and its progeny: "Recognizing in § 43(a) a
cause of action for misrepresentation of authorship of noncopyrighted
works (visual or otherwise) would render these limitations superflu-
ous. A statutory interpretation that renders another statute superflu-
ous is of course to be avoided. '2 63 In this respect, Dastar v. Fox
radiates outward to limit moral rights protection not simply in the nar-
row sphere that it confronted, but more generally as well.
The sequence is ironic-the United States joined the Berne Con-
vention while assuring members of the Berne Union that our domestic
law, including Smith v. Montoro, recognized moral rights; Congress
260. See supra Part III.A.3.b.
261. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34.
262. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 8D.06[B][1].
263. Dastar, 530 U.S. at 35. Though beyond the current scope, the further question arises
whether that ruling similarly dooms the pre-Dastar holding of the Second Circuit in Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), insofar as that case arose under sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Gilliam recognized a cause of action based on "mutilation" of the
plaintiffs' work. The court held that presentation of a mutilated work, if accompanied by the
author's name, violates section 43(a). The opinion described this entitlement in moral rights
terminology as "the right of the artist to have his work attributed to him in the form in which he
created it." Id. at 24 (citing 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 110.1). Moreover, a majority of the
Gilliam panel (with Judge Gurfein in disagreement) held that a notice disclaiming the authors'
approval of the edited version would not constitute a defense to such a cause of action. "We are
doubtful that a few words could erase the indelible impression that is made by a television
broadcast .... Furthermore, a disclaimer ... would go unnoticed by viewers who tuned into the
broadcast a few minutes after it began." Id. at 25 n.13. Even as to those who do notice it,
moreover, "some 'consumers are ignorant or inattentive, so some are bound to misunderstand
no matter how careful the producer is."' Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 936,
941 (N.D. 11. 1997), affd, 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997).
It must be noted that Gilliam, like Smith v. Montoro, arose under the pre-amendment version
of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Further, the heart of its ruling is that "ABC impaired the
integrity of appellants' work and represented to the public as the product of appellants what was
actually a mere caricature of their talents." Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25. That concern shows solici-
tude for the integrity right of authors-a domain that falls within the protection of the separate
enactment discussed above, viz. VARA. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46,
§ 8D.06[B] (attribution right under VARA); § 8D.06[C] (integrity right under VARA). It is pos-
sible that the Supreme Court would have been as unfavorably disposed towards Gilliam as it in
fact treated Smith v. Montoro. But the converse argument remains cognizable at present. See 3
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 8D.04[A][2].
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later passed VARA to further the process of Berne compliance. 264
Yet when the matter finally reached the Supreme Court, the latter
enactment served as partial basis for killing the rule of the former
case.
The question remains whether the short shrift that the Court paid to
the Berne Convention 265 subverts that treaty's strictures. To appreci-
ate this aspect, we must revert to the various prongs of the attribution
right. To reiterate, French law recognizes five attribution rights:
(a) the right to be known as the author of her work;
(b) the right to prevent others from falsely attributing to her the
authorship of a work that she has not in fact written;
(c) the right to prevent others from being named as the author of
her work;
(d) the right to publish a work anonymously or pseudonymously, as
well as the right to change her mind at a later date and claim
authorship under her own name; and
(e) the right to prevent others from using the work or the author's
name in such a way as to reflect adversely on her professional
standing.2 66
Among those rights, where does the cause of action urged by plaintiffs
in Dastar v. Fox fit? The gravamen of their charge was that Dastar
wrongfully listed itself as the origin of the videotapes at issue in that
case. Fox, in short, wished to prevent another from being named as
the source of origin of a work that it considered its own.267 That right
corresponds to the branch denominated (c) above.
The focus of Dastar v. Fox on prong (c) shows that, even if the
Court had deferred to Berne Convention jurisprudence, it need not
have reached a different conclusion. As canvassed above, the sparse
264. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 8 (1990) ("[Aldherence to the Berne Convention did not end
the debate about whether the United States should adopt artists' rights laws"). See supra
Part III.A.3.b. In fact, Congressional proposals to implement artists' rights date back to 1979.
Id. For an historical retrospective, see Monroe E. Price, Resuscitating a Collaboration with Mel-
ville Nimmer: Moral Rights and Beyond (Cardozo School of Law Occasional Paper No. 3, 1998),
available at http://www.cardozo.yv.edu/news-events/papers/3pdf.
265. See supra note 257.
266. See supra Part III.A.1.
267. Ironically, Fox actually did not occupy that status, and its co-plaintiffs occupied it even
less so. SFM and New Line had no role whatsoever in the original television series, so they
cannot claim to be the origin of Dastar's product under any plausible definition of that term.
Fox's contribution to the television series was managerial at best-it obtained television rights to
General Eisenhower's book and paid Time, Inc., to produce the television series. (Indeed, Fox's
own credits mention itself only in a subordinate clause: "A March of Time Production By Ar-
rangement with 20th Century Fox.") Even expanding "origin" to include claims of intangible
origination may not be enough to save Fox. Fox was not the only contributor to the original
television series. Nor was it the most important. Time, not Fox, actually produced the television
series, and Time's work in turn derives from a host of other sources, from General Eisenhower's
book to public domain footage shot by the armed forces of several nations. See supra note 234.
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text of the Berne Convention is more limited than le droit moral
under French law. In particular, it does not unambiguously include
prong (c). 2 68 Moreover, even when Congress explicitly accorded
moral rights under U.S. law, limited to works of visual art, it made the
explicit determination at that juncture to add various instantiations of
the attribution right-specifically excluding (c). 2 69 When properly ap-
preciated, therefore, the Solicitor's solicitude for Smith v. Montoro
was unnecessary in the context of the Berne Convention.270 Instead,
full compliance with Article 6bis would require augmenting different
prongs of the attribution right under U.S. law. 271
There is an additional reason why even antennae finely tuned to
Berne frequencies may legitimately filter out the signal emitted by
Dastar v. Fox. As previously explained, moral rights under the Berne
Convention need not, unlike their French forebears, be perpetual, ina-
lienable, and imprescriptible. 272 Rather, the Berne Convention com-
mands protection for its particular species of attribution and integrity
rights only for as long as the copyright remains in subsistence (and
concomitantly affords latitude for individual nations to accord protec-
tion under Article 6bis for considerably less than the full copyright
term, so long as they subsist for as long as the author is living).2 73 By
contrast, Dastar v. Fox reached the United States Supreme Court in a
posture imposing liability for reverse passing off even in the absence
of any copyright protection for the book and video of Crusade in Eu-
rope.2 74 For all these reasons, the need to safeguard a reverse passing-
268. See supra Part III.A.2. Also note the latitude given to individual states to calibrate the
level of protection that they wish to accord. See id.
269. See supra Part III.A.3.b.
270. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
271. As noted above, the best rationale looks neither to the deficiency of other Berne Union
states' laws, nor to exceptions from enforcement under the TRIPs protocol. See supra Part
III.A.3.a. Rather, the proposition advanced herein is that the strictures of the Berne Convention
do not extend to the domain of reverse passing off. "Accordingly, the U.S. can hold its head
high in international circles, even as it deliberately declines to recognize legal protection for
attribution (c) invoked above." Id. See also text accompanying note 111.
272. Even in France, it is doubtful that corporate entities, such as Fox, would be able to vindi-
cate a cause of action for violation of le droit moral. As the preeminent commentator notes,
"l'oeuvre de l'esprit est avant tout l'6manation d'une personnalit6." LUCAS, supra note 59,
§ 367, at 303. The famous Asphalt Jungle case held at one stage that a "moral right is inalienably
vested in a natural person" and hence the motion picture studio could not exploit the very work
over which it owned the copyright in its altered (colorized) state. Lucas et al., supra note 52,
§ 7[4][a].
273. See supra Part III.A.2.
274. Even if it were ultimately to be concluded that copyright protection continues for Gen-
eral Eisenhower's underlying memoirs, the ex-President's death in 1961 means that the Berne
Convention does not obligate the United States to accord moral-rights protection to that work at
any time after that date.
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off tort in the context of Dastar v. Fox exerts scant significance for
safeguarding the integrity of U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention.
2. Should There Be a General Right to Forestall Listing Credit for
Non-Authors?
Passing from construction of the Lanham Act and of the Berne
Convention to questions of policy, would it be a good idea for the
legislature to institute the moral right denominated (c) above? In
other words, in the wake of the Court's decision in Dastar v. Fox,
should Congress or the various state legislatures275 step in to create a
general right, apart from copyright, to prevent others from being
named as the author of a work? 276 To answer these questions, it is
necessary to divide the inquiry between works in copyright and works
in the public domain.
a. Works Subject to Copyright Protection
i.
At present, works in copyright protection are subject to attribution
in the United States: The author is the initial copyright holder and
fully controls the work's initial publication. If the author consents to
the dissemination of her work, she may by agreement require the use
of her name, the omission of her name, or the use of a pseudonym. In
each instance, the author's choice may be enforced by appropriate liti-
gation sounding in contract law.277 Accordingly, authors who retain
the full panoply of rights could, in theory, vindicate each and every
moral right (a)-(h) under U.S., no less than under French, law.278
As to works currently subject to copyright protection in the United
States, the proprietor controls their dissemination. If the publisher,
having acquired title, substitutes her nephew's name for the author's
on the book's cover, the result seems to be a pollution of the cognitive
275. To the extent that states were to enact such laws, the further question would arise
whether they are preempted. Given the conclusion reached below as to the undesirability of
such laws, that question is left dangling.
276. I have previously commented that Congress acts best when it limits its attention back-
wards to correcting the results of concrete cases with which it disagrees, rather than facing for-
ward to regulate an emerging domain comprehensively for the future. See David Nimmer,
Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233 (2004). The current question is
whether Dastar v. Fox qualifies as such a wrongly decided case deserving Congressional
correction.
277. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 8D.03[A][3].
278. The Supreme Court has admonished that "it is well to remember that the property of the
author or painter in his intellectual creation is absolute until he voluntarily parts with the same."
Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299 (1907).
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well of mankind. On reflection, however, the harm to society occa-
sioned thereby is identical to that caused by an author's decision to
publish his own work pseudonymously. In both cases, the public
purchases a work denominated as being authored by X, whereas in
fact it was composed by Y.
Under the Berne Convention (as interpreted by its secretariat), 279
one right guaranteed to authors is the right to publish pseudony-
mously, corresponding to right (d) catalogued above.280 Accordingly,
adherence to our treaty obligations precludes adoption of a new truth-
in-labeling law requiring that the author's true name be invariably af-
fixed to works of authorship.281 To the extent that the legislature de-
clines, on that basis, to craft a categorical law, it is unclear why it
should enact a statute more narrowly tailored to the publisher's
nephew and like instances.282
In particular, let us revert to the tort of reverse passing off at issue
in Dastar v. Fox, corresponding to moral right (c). For current pur-
poses, we will assume that President Eisenhower's memoirs will be
determined to be protected by copyright when their status is ulti-
mately adjudicated. 283 It follows that Dastar would become liable for
copyright infringement by distribution of its video.284 Thus, the copy-
right owner could not only vindicate moral right (c) by demanding
appropriate attribution, but also could shut down Dastar's distribution
279. See supra Part III.A.2.
280. See supra Part III.A.1. For a review of all the moral rights, see supra note 2.
281. Let us imagine that his publisher deems Salman Rushdie too controversial, and therefore
markets The Satanic Verses under the name "Halibut Hurrydie." In France, it has thereby vio-
lated the author's inherent right (c). But now consider that Stephen King once voluntarily wrote
under the pseudonym "Richard Bachman" as an experiment to see if he could achieve success
on the inherent greatness of his writing rather than based on brand recognition. Under French
law, that is his inherent right as well, corresponding to (d). Further, according to the Guide to
the Berne Convention, adhering states must recognize (d) but not (c). See supra Part llI.A.2. In
other words, Article 6bis of the Berne Convention guarantees King the right to engage in his
little experiment; if Congress were to implement an inherent consumer right for truth-in-label-
ing, the result would be to deny King the right to call himself Bachman, and thereby place the
United States afoul of its treaty obligations!
282. Part of the problem here inheres in the mismatch between Continental legal objections
and those underlying U.S. law. Le droit moral arises out of the desire to protect the author's
personality. By contrast, protections under state unfair competition laws and under sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act "are grounded in the identical objectives of protecting consumers
from confusion and deception." Kwall, supra note 113, at 1016. For that reason, the Lanham
Act is a poor vehicle to vindicate "damage to the author's spiritual interest." Id. at 1020-21.
283. That matter remains sub judice at present. See supra note 188.
284. That conclusion requires the further assumption that Dastar's videos are substantially
similar to the Eisenhower memoirs. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, § 13.03.
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of the videotape altogether.2 85 It follows that the instant domain is
hardly one in which U.S. law slights authorial interests such that sup-
plemental protection is needed.
Based on the foregoing, such scenarios as the publisher's nephew
arise only when the author has signed away her rights without safe-
guarding her right of attribution. Is legislation that would create an
inalienable right of attribution, d la mode frangaise, either needed or
desirable?
One could posit that "authors are congenitally irresponsible, [and]
that frequently they are so sorely pressed for funds"2 86 that they will
blithely give up rights that the law would otherwise secure to them.
2 87
It may be that contract boilerplate in the copyright industries typically
so provides. But before mounting a corrective campaign in Congress,
what is required is an empirical investigation into whether society cur-
rently confronts scores of compositions being vended by their copy-
right owners in derogation of the true author's name.28 8 With no such
problem apparent to this observer, the need for legislation on this
score strikes me as lacking.
289
What about works made for hire? In those instances, U.S. law
290
treats the initial author not as the human being who creates the copy-
rightable composition, but rather as that person's employer.29' One
might thereupon conclude that the opportunity to contract posited
above is absent, such that a new law is needed. On reflection, though,
that proposition does not hold water. First, employees do indeed con-
tract with the erstwhile copyright owner. True, the negotiations might
not take place before the creation of each individual work, but they
285. The embedded assumption here is that the prevailing plaintiff would be able to obtain an
injunction-which is not invariably the case. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46,
§ 14.06[B].
286. Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 656 (1943).
287. An old view holds that authors "are more subject than most men to indolence .... They
must somehow be blasted out of this agreeable aimlessness, and one of the best ways is the hope
of producing a competence for their children," Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of
Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 508 (1945).
288. In other words, even if publishers typically secure such rights by boilerplate contracts, no
harm arises unless they subsequently act thereon by putting out works under names other than
the authors'.
289. As the matter is empirical, I would adopt the contrary conclusion, if presented with the
requisite surveys proving that the problem is widespread and causing serious dislocation.
290. Note that under French and German law, computer programmers categorically, and cer-
tain other authors under given circumstances, might be divested of moral rights in their creations
pursuant to an analog to the work-for-hire doctrine. See Gunlicks, supra note 51, at 651.
291. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000). The consequence, of course, is that the human author
loses any ability to assert moral rights. See, e.g., Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1259-60
(9th Cir. 1994) (publisher need not credit author). See also infra note 379.
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must predate the beginning of the process by which the employee cre-
ates works of authorship. 292 To the extent that the future loss of attri-
bution is deemed unacceptable, the employee always has the option of
declining the proffered job. Again, only paternalism 293 regarding em-
ployees as congenitally irresponsible would warrant abrogation of the
normal scheme of freedom of contract.
Even more fundamentally, it is necessary to inquire whether at pre-
sent society confronts corporate copyright owners who routinely com-
mit attribution atrocities. For these purposes, Hollywood is
illustrative. The battles there over "credit" are legendary.294 Hardly
indicative of lack of respect for crediting who does what, every film to
come out of the major studios-as well as every newspaper advertise-
ment and billboard-prominently features the names of its stars, pro-
ducer, and director. As previously noted, guilds organized for this
purpose engage in their own quasi-judicial enforcement of such mat-
ters of attribution. 295 In short, the evidence is lacking that society
needs a new law guaranteeing an inalienable right of attribution in the
name of the initial author (either corporate or human, depending on
how aggressively the legislature wished to ape French norms).
Moreover, such a new law would not help the particular claimants
in Dastar v. Fox. Recall that Twentieth Century Fox arranged for
Time Inc. to produce the original television series based on the book.
Depending on the contours of the new law, Time Inc. might have had
a cause of action against the three plaintiffs who filed suit: Fox, New
Line, and SFM. None of them qualified as the original author who
should be credited under a theory of inalienability.2 96 Or perhaps the
new law would protect not even Time Inc., but instead its human em-
ployees who actually created the original series (whose personal iden-
tities were erased by Time). What seems clear is that even after
292. Although the circuits disagree as to commissioned works about whether the subject
agreement must be memorialized before the work in question is created, they agree that the
substantive agreement must be in place between the parties before the work in question is cre-
ated in order for it to be deemed a work made for hire. See Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco
Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992) (requiring writing beforehand); Playboy Enters, Inc. v.
Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 560 (2d Cir. 1995) (allowing post-creation writing to memorialize pre-crea-
tion agreement).
293. At this point, I throw in the towel instead of seeking rigorous gender neutrality. See
supra text accompanying note 56. But this might be the felicitous point to acknowledge the
perspective that plagiarism is "a cultural notion [that] affirms the superiority of the masculine
intellect." Rebecca Moore Howard, The New Abolitionism Comes to Plagiarism, in PERSPEC-
TIVES ON PLAGIARISM, supra note 56, at 87, 95 n.5.
294. See supra note 201.
295. Id.
296. See supra note 234.
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passage of such a hypothetical law of inalienable attribution, the bene-
ficiaries thereunder would be other than the plaintiffs who sued
Dastar.
ii.
To end this section, consider a work about writing and attribution in
theatrical distribution at the time that Dastar v. Fox was sub judice
before the Court. I refer to the film Adaptation. At this point, STOP!
If you have not seen the movie, then do not continue with so trivial an
exercise as reading this article-which in the process will give away
the film's surprise and spoil the enjoyment. Instead, leave this dreary
text and go experience the movie. Only then will you and I, friend,
have established the necessary commonality to appreciate what is
coming next.
Back already? You did see the movie-right? Very well; on we go.
Screenwriting credit for the movie goes to Charlie Kaufman and
Donald Kaufman. Of course, the movie itself is about Charlie Kauf-
man and Donald Kaufman. The latter dies in the third act. The final
screen proclaims: "In Loving Memory of Donald Kaufman." All very
well and good-except for the fact that there is no Donald Kaufman.
The attribution on the film is therefore false. 297
The copyright owner consented to that false credit, as undoubtedly
did Charlie Kaufman. 298 Therefore, neither of them can complain
under current law. If the impetus for a new law mandating inalienable
truth-in-authorship were to lie in a sense that the public has a right to
be truthfully apprised as to who did what, regardless of what the copy-
right owner might have to say on the subject, then it would ensnare
Adaptation in its net. That reason alone suffices for me to reject the
utility of such a new law.299
297. Screenwriters in the past have likewise had other reasons to have their work appear
pseudonymously. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act
of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 590, 620 n.99 (1987).
298. The word "undoubtedly" in that sentence denotes the fact that I am making an assump-
tion, for which I lack proof. I hereby promise a complimentary treatise to the reader who proves
me wrong.
299. Bobbi Kwall offers the valuable insight that "little attention has been given to the idea of
unpacking the components of moral rights protections and analyzing each strand of this doctrine
separately." Kwall, supra note 113, at 1027. She proposes separating attribution rights from
other species of moral rights and implementing a proposal to protect the former under U.S. law.
Id. at 1027-32. I would go further: Having unbundled the attribution right itself into five sepa-
rate prongs, I propose treating them separately. In particular, this article shows that right (b)
currently enjoys great support in the United States, which is a salutary feature of our laws. The
proposition advanced herein is that that status should continue while simultaneously right (c)
should not constitute a freestanding obligation under the positive laws of the United States (as
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b. Works in the Public Domain
Moving from works still subject to copyright protection to works in
the public domain, new dynamics emerge. Although we have already
seen that the author of a work subject to copyright protection can
theoretically vindicate all moral rights (a)-(h),300 the author of a work
in the public domain is largely bereft of such protection. Anyone can
publish it over her objection, even if it were previously unpublished.30 1
So there goes (g), the droit de divulgation. Anyone can adapt it, even
in ways the author detests, so there is no (f) droit au respect de
l'oeuvre, either. Even if the author recants, anyone can also continue
to publish it, so there is no (h) droit de repentir.302
In terms of the five attribution rights (a)-(e), those are all gone,
too. But there is one exception: (b) the right to prevent others from
falsely attributing to her the authorship of a work that she has not in
fact written. That conduct constitutes passing off, even after expira-
tion of copyright. The deceptive use of an author's name to sell books
she did not write redresses a legal interest distinct from protecting the
work of authorship itself, and for that reason continues indefinitely.
In terms of the Berne Convention, that state of affairs complies
with the treaty obligations of the United States, for Article 6bis re-
quires protection only for so long as the copyright lasts. 30 3 Therefore,
even if it did not continue to afford right (b), the failure of U.S. law to
accord moral rights protection to works in the public domain does not
bring it afoul of international commitments.
30 4
But is it nonetheless a good idea to institute moral rights protection
here?
Amy Heckerling produced a mild hit called Clueless.30 5 During its
upward trajectory, she revealed that the plot was based on Jane Aus-
ten's Emma.306 The Coen Brothers composed 0 Brother, Where Art
opposed to under the guild rules adopted by various segments of the population). (For a quick
enumeration of the various moral rights, see supra note 2.)
300. See supra Part III.C.2.a. As just noted, those various moral rights are summarized supra
note 2.
301. That right under U.S. law began as to unpublished works only last year, given that all
unpublished works were protected until at least December 31, 2002. See 3 NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT, supra note 46, § 9.09[A].
302. See supra Part III.A.1. For a review of all the moral rights, see supra note 2.
303. See supra Part III.A.2.
304. Moreover, as recounted above, certain moral rights last for the entire term of copyright.
At present, the copyright term under U.S. law lasts for seventy years after the author's death. 17
U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000). By contrast, the Berne Convention allows leeway to accord such protec-
tion solely for the life of the author. See supra Part III.A.2.
305. CLUELESS (Paramount Pictures 1995).
306. JANE AUSTEN, EMMA (Bantam reprint 1984) (1815).
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Thou?307 A screen credit indicates that it was "Based on The Odyssey
by Homer. ' 30 8 Fox itself released Romeo+Juliet,30 9 starring Leonardo
di Caprio and Claire Danes as the star-crossed lovers on some kind of
post-modern beach.
Do we want to have courts tell Heckerling that she initially fell
afoul of moral right (a)? To tell the Coens that their vision was not
Homer's, placing them afoul of (c)? To tell Fox that its desecration is
not appreciated, and moreover violates (f)? Unleashing the civil law's
vision of moral rights onto the litigious society known as the United
States seems nothing less than a formula for an explosion of dubious
claims.310
3. Resolving the First Two Scenarios
Winding our way back to Herodotus, we now have our answer. If
Shady Screenwriter were an honorable individual, he would credit the
story for Feuding Princesses to the father of history.311 But to the ex-
tent that Shady lives up to his name, the means for redress need not
be legal. Society should not create a new tort for which a plaintiff
could obtain standing to haul Shady into court in order to judge
whether the various tales unfolding on screen trace their lineage back
to The Histories. Instead, the remedy should be reviews, publicity,
and other education.
We therefore reach our answer to Scenario One. There should be
no actionable legal redress to Shady's machinations.
What about Scenario Two? Does the alteration from the desired
title of To Prevent The Traces Of Human Events From Being Erased
By Time to the actual title of Prevent The Traces Of Human Events
From Being Erased By Time: A Discourse on Academic Writing rise to
the level of being appropriately subject to legal redress? Absolutely
not. The alteration simply refuses to accept a speaker's self-indulgent
allusion as the sum and substance of publicity for his talk; instead, it
clothes that allusion with a more concrete appraisal to the audience of
307. 0 BROTHER, WHERE ART THOU? (Touchstone Pictures 2000).
308. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY (Penguin new ed. 1999) (800 B.C.E.).
309. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE'S ROMEO+JULIET (Twentieth Century Fox 1996).
310. In Continental eyes, any interruption of the dramatic development of a movie for com-
mercial messages could be viewed as a "mutilation." Mario Fabiani & Alberto Musso, Italy
§ 7[1][b], in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 52 (intermediate court
holding that "interruptions by spot commercials alter and disfigure the identitfy of the film work
being broadcast"; later amendments promulgated to Broadcasting Act on this subject). Imple-
menting that right in the United States might entail the bankruptcy of all the commercial televi-
sion networks.
311. See supra note 4.
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the subject matter to be covered. Even if the speaker self-righteously
thought the new title a monstrosity that failed to convey his deathless
contribution on the day of the conference, it scarcely contributes to
social welfare to allow him to vent his spleen through the instrumen-
tality of the courts. The organizers of a conference, no less than its
keynote speaker, share a vital interest in accurately apprising the pub-
lic as to the content of each presentation. To the extent that the two
fail to see eye to eye, that is unfortunate-but hardly the basis on
which to multiply new causes of action.
Investigating more deeply, even if we were to assume that this law
review took an article entitled To Prevent The Traces Of Human
Events From Being Erased By Time and unilaterally decided to pub-
lish it under the title of Prevent The Traces Of Human Events From
Being Erased By Time: A Discourse on Academic Writing, listing the
author as David Nimmer, there has been no violation. Even in
France, that conduct might fail to be actionable, as it (a) fails to dero-
gate from his right to be known of the author of what is in fact his
work, (b) does not involve any false attribution, (c) does not involve
others being named as the author, (d) involves nothing about anony-
mous or pseudonymous presentation, and (e) does not reflect ad-
versely on his professional standing.312 A fortiori, it constitutes no
violation of the less protective strictures of U.S. law.
313
We have seen that no actionable violation arises from Scenarios
One and Two. It is submitted, however, that the opposite conclusion
pertains to Scenario Three. To appreciate the differences requires a
separate investigation.
IV. PLAGIARISM
Even after the initiation of copyright protection via the statute of
Anne in 1709,314 "copyright infringement" remained unknown. This is
not to say that all parties scrupulously respected copyrights once they
were created. Rather, it is a matter of terminology. 315 During this
period, the relevant term for violating a copyright was "usurpa-
tion. ' 316 Other terms then in vogue were "piracy" and "plagiary.
' 317
312. See supra Part III.A.1.
313. See supra Part III.A.3.
314. See HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE (1956).
315. "At that time, there was no such thing as intellectual 'property.' Rather, the term 'pro-
priety' defined the state of mind of all concerned." Nimmer, supra note note 12, at 125 (citing
ADRIAN JOHNS, THE NATURE OF THE BOOK 187-90 (1998)).
316. JOHNS, supra note 315, at 461.
317. Id.
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Plagiary meant in the first instance slave trading; by extension, it was
applied to stealing books.318
A. Dastar Again
The last term has stayed with us, currently in the version "plagia-
rism. '319 The Court in Dastar v. Fox even invoked it last term. Its
reference arose in the context of attempting to define the proper do-
main of copyright law, an intricate puzzle that had previously engaged
many lower courts,320 but which the Supreme Court itself had previ-
ously ducked. 321 Considering whether section 43(a) of the Lanham
318. Id. n.31. See LINDEY, supra note 46, at 95; Dursht, supra note 58, at 1263.
319. A vast literature underlies this term, comprising many of the greats of literature.
Heinrich Heine commented, "Nothing is sillier than this charge of plagiarism." THE NEW Dic-
TIONARY OF THOUGHTS 483 (Tryon Edwards ed., 1977). Emerson expressed it as follows: "All
minds quote. Old and new make the warp and woof of every moment. There is no thread that is
not a twist of these two strands. By necessity, by proclivity and by delight, we all quote." RALPH
WALDO EMERSON, Quotation and Originality, in LETTERS AND SOCIAL AIMs: THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON VOLUME 8, at 178 (1904). T.S. Eliot famously stated,
"Immature poets imitate; mature poets steal; bad poets deface what they take, and good poets
make it into something better, or at least something different." T.S. Eliot, Philip Massinger, in
ESSAYS ON ELIZABETHAN DRAMA 153 (1932). Alexandre Dumas phrased it this way: "The man
of genius does not steal, he conquers: He makes of the province that he takes an annex of his
empire; he imposes on it his laws, he peoples it with his subjects." Marilyn Randall, Imperial
Plagiarism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM, supra note 56, at 131, 134-35 (detailing charges of
plagiarism against Dumas); LINDEY, supra note 46, at 224-25 (quoting Dumas, when shown an
error in his book, as stating. "I haven't read it. Let me see, who was it that wrote that one for
me? Why that rascal Auguste! I'll take care of him!"). Byron in turn commented that "the most
original writers are the greatest thieves." Id. at 63.
Andr6 Schwart-Bart, when plagiarized by an African student in a flagrant display of "reverse
colonialism," remarked that "it is not Mr. Ouologuem who is in debt to me, but I to him."
Randall, supra, at 136, 140 n.5. Hegel commented, "It may be that honour has been effective in
abolishing plagiarism, or perhaps plagiarism has ceased to be dishonorable and feeling against it
is a thing of the past; or possibly an ingenious and trivial idea, and a change in external form, is
rated so highly as originality and a product of independent thinking that the thought of plagia-
rism has become wholly insufferable." HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 56 (T.M. Knox trans.
1952). For the perspective of Immanuel Kant on the subject, see Gilbert Larochelle, From Kant
to Foucault: What Remains of the Author in Postmodernism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM,
supra note 56, at 121, 123.
320. For example, Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 124 F. Supp. 2d 836, 842-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
allowed an author who claimed to have originated materials out of which Harry Potter was fash-
ioned to maintain various claims (as a matter of valid pleading) against J.K. Rowling and her
publisher, including reverse passing off and false representation of origin. See id. at 843 n.8
(declining to consider case solely in copyright terms).
321. In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001), the Court fi-
nessed the question of whether copyright law limits rights conferred by other statutes. In that
case, the owner of a patented dual-spring mechanism that allowed signs to withstand strong
winds wished to continue its exclusive rights in the invention even after its patent expired. Id. at
26. It therefore alleged that the mechanism had acquired secondary meaning and sued a rival
manufacturer for violating its trade dress. The Supreme Court denied such trade dress protec-
tion based on the disparity between trade dress and patent rights with regard to functionality.
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Act should treat visegrips322 and other consumer products differently
from communicative products such as books or videos (which custom-
ers purchase for their intellectual property rather than their physical
properties),32 3 the Court rejected the posited distinction on which the
Smith v. Montoro line of cases had rested:
The problem with this argument according special treatment to
communicative products is that it causes the Lanham Act to conflict
with the law of copyright, which addresses that subject specifically.
The right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a copyright
has expired, like "the right to make [an article whose patent has
expired]-including the right to make it in precisely the shape it
carried when patented passes to the public." . . . The rights of a
patentee or copyright holder are part of a "carefully crafted bar-
gain," under which, once the patent or copyright monopoly has ex-
pired, the public may use the invention or work at will and without
attribution. Thus, in construing the Lanham Act, we have been
"careful to caution against misuse or over-extension" of trademark
Id. at 29-31. Indeed, the inventor's very process of securing patent protection (and subsequently
safeguarding it via litigation) indicated that the design provided a unique and useful mechanism
to resist wind shearing. Given that trade dress does not extend to functional features, the claim
failed. Id.
What did that ruling about the unavailability of trade dress protection following patent expira-
tion import with respect to expired copyrights? On the surface, nothing-indeed, quite to the
contrary of patent protection, the process of applying for copyright requires the claimant to urge
non-functionality. There is nothing inconsistent with claiming that one has developed original
aesthetics entitled to copyright protection as a fixed work of authorship and, after the copyright
term has passed, claiming that the same work is distinctively associated with its purveyor and has
acquired secondary meaning subject to protection as trade dress.
Yet from a deeper perspective, the same considerations that doomed trade dress protection in
TrafFix v. Marketing Displays could be argued to operate in the copyright sphere as well. In
other words, as part of the constitutional trade-off for obtaining copyright protection, the argu-
ment lay that once expiration occurs, the work belongs to the public; for the erstwhile proprietor
to urge a different legal theory at that juncture betrays the bargain by which it initially secured a
governmentally sanctioned monopoly in the subject work. At the very end of its opinion, the
Court gingerly approached that notion:
TrafFix and some of its amici argue that the Patent [and Copyright] Clause of the Con-
stitution, of its own force, prohibits the holder of an expired utility patent from claim-
ing trade dress protection. We need not resolve this question. If, despite the rule that
functional features may not be the subject of trade dress protection, a case arises in
which trade dress becomes the practical equivalent of an expired utility patent, that will
be time enough to consider the matter.
Id. at 35 (citations omitted). The amicus curiae brief of Malla Pollack focused on the bargain
that patentees make with the government and the public by affirmatively seeking patent protec-
tion and more generally addressed the political theory, endorsed by the founding fathers, of a
Lockean commons on which all may draw. See Amicus Brief Supporting Petitioner, TrafFix
Devices, Inc. Requesting Reversal, 2000 WL 1218785, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Dis-
plays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (No. 99-1571).
322. For the reference to vise-grips in oral argument, see infra text accompanying note 359.
323. Dastar v. Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003).
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and related protections into areas traditionally occupied by patent
or copyright. 324
Dastar sold videotapes that it manufactured, incorporating elements
from a copyrighted work that, during the period of its subsistence,
plaintiff Fox owned but which Fox had failed to timely renew, thus
injecting it into the public domain. Those considerations are what
moved the Court to reject "a species of mutant copyright law that
limits the public's federal right to copy and to use, expired copy-
rights. ' '32 5 Its unanimous ruling in favor of Dastar gives wide berth to
copyright principles in defeating the claims of creative plaintiffs326
who attempt to dress in other garb what is at base a claim for copying
the expression of another. The Court noted that its previous cases
could not square with "creating a cause of action for, in effect, plagia-
rism-the use of otherwise unprotected works and inventions without
attribution." 327
B. Against a Free-Flow Credit Obligation
The Court's erection of a barrier against plagiarism sets the current
direction for legal protection. One court long ago stated, "a writer's
reputation, which would be greatly enhanced by public credit for au-
thorship of an outstanding picture, is his stock in trade; it is clear that
irreparable injury would follow the failure to give him screen credit if
in fact he is entitled to it.'"328 But a later court recognized that "cred-
its run off on the screen immediately prior to or after the showing of
the story portion of the film are of more interest to the industry than
to the public. Adequate opportunity will exist, if this case is expedi-
tiously processed, to insure publication of plaintiff['s] authorship of
the idea to the industry if she is ultimately held entitled to such
credit. '329 The Ninth Circuit in Smith v. Montoro330 inclined towards
324. Id. at 33-34 (citations omitted).
325. Id. at 34 (internal quotations omitted). See supra text accompanying note 236.
326. The reference to "creative plaintiffs" is ramified. It refers to plaintiffs in the creative
industries (those who write books or act in movies, for example) who hire litigators themselves
endowed with the creative flair to repurpose an old doctrine of law with a new spin.
327. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36. The Court cited in that regard Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000), and Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141 (1989). Id. at 36-37. It also stated, "To hold otherwise would be akin to finding that § 43(a)
created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do." Id. at 37
(citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003)).
328. Poe v. Michael Todd Co., 151 F. Supp. 801, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (preliminary injunction
denied).
329. Luster Enters., Inc. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 156 U.S.P.Q. 422 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1967). See Luster Enters., Inc. v. Jacobs, 278 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The
cases likewise recognize that credit may also be of critical import in academe, where "marketa-
bility" can depend on one's curriculum vitae. See, e.g., Omiogui v. W.B. Saunders Co., 30
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the former view, but in Dastar the Supreme Court favored the lat-
ter.3 31 It remarked that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act "does not
have boundless application as a remedy for unfair trade practices. 332
Consideration of what would happen if a free-floating credit obliga-
tion existed under U.S. law333 leads inexorably into a dystopia.334 Let
us begin with the Dastar litigation at its various court levels. Starting
at the Supreme Court, the brief that my colleagues and I filed on be-
half of Dastar 335 reflected our best effort to encapsulate powerful ar-
guments. Consider the following attempts at eloquence:
No one views Harper's Magazine as a false designation simply be-
cause James and John Harper do not write its contents. Indeed, it is
only in the Montoro world of mutant copyright law that the question
even arises. In the world of real copyright law, it is plain that Das-
tar's name belongs on the videotape. Dastar's modification of the
original television series meets the substantive standard for an inde-
pendently copyrighted derivative work, and the Copyright Act has
long encouraged copyright owners to put their names on copy-
righted works. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(b)(3) & (d), 405(b), &
1202(b)-(c) (2000).336
U.S.P.Q.2d 1716, 1717 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 927
(2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995). See infra Part.IV.C.
330. 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
331. In oral argument, Justice Kennedy referred to "screen credits," that roll when "you
know, you're going to the refrigerator or reading cert petitions or something." Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 257, at *46-47. See id. at *18 ("the credits which no one ever
reads").
332. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 29. Previous decisions had sometimes applied that same sensibility.
See, e.g., Comins v. Discovery Communications, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 512, 522 (D. Md. 2002)
("However ungracious it may seem for Defendants to have included Comins in its 'thank you'
list after deciding not to produce a film based on the Book, '[the] Lanham Act ... should not be
used as a remedy for a bruised ego.'") (quoting Stratta v. George Duke Enters., 1997 WL
282250, *5 (S.D.N.Y.)). But other courts had ruled to the contrary. A month before Dastar was
decided, for example, the Sixth Circuit barred defendants from presenting a song about Rosa
Parks (featuring the lyric, "Everybody move to the back of the bus") on the basis that that title
was purportedly not "artistically related to the content of the song." Parks v. LaFace Records,
329 F.3d 437, 442, 458 (6th Cir. 2003). But previously, the Ninth Circuit refused to restrain
defendants from presenting a song about a Barbie girl. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296
F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002). It remains open after Dastar whether the Sixth Circuit's point of view
relies on the now-discarded construction of section 43(a) as having "boundless application as a
remedy for unfair trade practices."
333. For a collection of quotations about the baleful effects that general moral rights would
exert on the U.S. book publishing, newspaper, and motion picture industries, see Kwall, supra
note 48, at 28.
334. What works for one nation's laws does not necessarily work for another's. The strong
German moral right, for instance, has given rise to almost no actual litigation. See supra note 97.
French vindication of moral rights may result in damages in the amount of one franc. See Gun-
licks, supra note 51, at 626. Damages in U.S. civil actions are not typically so cabined.
335. See supra note 189.
336. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 117, at *22-23 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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Remarkably, even expanding "origin" to include claims of intangi-
ble origination may not be enough to save Fox. Fox was not the
only contributor to the original television series. Nor was it the
most important. Time, not Fox, actually produced the television se-
ries, and Time's work in turn derived from a host of other sources,
from General Eisenhower's book to public domain footage shot by
the armed forces of several nations. Determining the origin of a
collaborative and much-modified work is the judicial equivalent of
searching for the source of the Nile. In that search, however, Fox is
at best a minor tributary.
Fox therefore can prevail only if the Lanham Act treats as "false"
any designation of origin that does not list everyone who contrib-
uted in any way to the prior work-not just the one true source of
the Nile, but every stream in its drainage basin. At a minimum this
would seem to include everyone who is credited in any fashion in
the original work, plus anyone credited in later modifications. Such
credit obligations would continue to accrete forever, with the credits
growing longer every time the work is changed. Waldman, 43 F.3d
at 785 n.8 (defendant must credit plaintiff as origin of defendant's
work, but must also note that plaintiff in turn had rewritten an ear-
lier work). 337
Perhaps the italicized references in those extracts ring a familiar
chord. For, as set forth above, when it came time for Justice Scalia to
craft the Court's unanimous opinion, he concluded that allowing Fox
to maintain a cause of action under section 43(a) for Dastar's repre-
sentation of itself as "origin" of the videotapes that it produced
"would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the public's
federal right to copy and to use, expired copyrights. ' 338 The Court
likewise concluded, "We do not think the Lanham Act requires this
search for the source of the Nile and all its tributaries. ,339 Happily for
Justice Scalia (as well as for the U.S. justice system), his own opinion
in Dastar eliminates any right to maintain that those words in the
Court's opinion represent reverse passing off, thus forestalling my col-
leagues and me from calling him to the bar!340
Moving one level down, consider the per curiam decision from the
Ninth Circuit subject to the writ of certiorari in Dastar. How did
337. Id. at *27 (emphasis added).
338. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
339. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added).
340. I shudder to think where the contrary ruling would have led. My best recollection is that
David Gerber is the mutant and Stewart Baker the modern-day Mr. Livingtson, whereas I my-
self came up with none of those bon mrots. See supra note 189. But if the Supreme Court had
recognized a cause of action for reverse passing off any time a writer's words are not properly
credited to him, then all of us who authored the brief undoubtedly would have striven inter sese
to claim origination of those snippets.
[Vol. 54:1
2004] REVERSE PASSING OFF
Judges Kozinski, Gould, and Breyer 341 go about crafting their unpub-
lished decision that affirmed the judgment in favor of plaintiffs for
reverse passing off? In Congressional testimony, the first has ex-
plained that "circuit judges devote something like half their time, and
half the time of their clerks, to cases in which they write [published]
opinions, dissents or concurrences," and that they give comparatively
little attention to unpublished dispositions.342 Although his testimony
does not specify, it is reasonable to extrapolate that judges focus their
attention disproportionately on the former category, 343 relegating the
latter more to their clerks. 344 But, of course, any given decision itself
bears only the judges' names. What does that phenomenon reflect? 345
If my suspicion is correct that uncredited clerks contributed to the
words adopted by the appellate panel3 46 in Dastar,347 then it is not
only Justice Scalia who, in a world where reverse passing off were
given broad latitude, would have to watch his back.
Going down another level still, what about the district court opinion
in Dastar v. Fox? Throughout the trial court proceedings, Judge
Cooper followed the practice of many trial judges in asking the pre-
vailing party to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law, to which
the court could append its signature. (Although it would afford fortu-
341. See supra note 187.
342. Testimony of Hon. Alex Kozinski Before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property, Washington, D.C., June 27, 2002, available at http://notabug.com/kozinski/
unpublisheddispositions (last visited June 5, 2004) ("Not worrying about making law in 3800
unpublished dispositions frees us to concentrate on those decisions that will affect others besides
the parties to the appeal.").
343. "In order to maintain a clear and consistent body of caselaw, appellate judges spend much
of their time working on published opinions-those that announce and calibrate the circuit's
decisional law." Id. (emphasis added).
344. "[A]n unpublished disposition can often be prepared in only a few hours." Id. It seems
not unreasonable to posit that those few hours would be better spent by a clerk than the judge.
345. The prime focus of Judge Kozinski's testimony is to deny any imputation that unpub-
lished decisions reflect lawlessness. Id. ("I can state with some confidence that the sinister sug-
gestion that our unpublished dispositions conceal a multitude of injustices and inconsistencies is
simply not borne out by the evidence."). Dastar confirms his conclusion. Though we obviously
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in presenting the matter to the Supreme Court, my
colleagues and I mounted our attack not at the inconsistency of this particular judgment, but on
the contrary at the entire body of Ninth Circuit law initiated by Smith v. Montoro. Unfortu-
nately for our client, the Ninth Circuit's unpublished resolution of Dastar v. Fox was only too
consistent with that line of cases.
346. Id. ("[T]he phrasing (as opposed to the result) of an unpublished disposition is given
relatively little scrutiny by the other chambers.").
347. Even if the situation does not happen to pertain in this particular case, the general phe-
nomenon remains: "Some judges sign off on their clerks' opinions with little or no supervisory or
editorial input." Lerman, supra note 11, at 469. "[Tlhe caseload per federal judge has risen to
the point where very few judges, however able and dedicated, can keep up with the flow without
heavy reliance on law clerks, staff attorneys, and sometimes externs too." RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 103 (1985).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
itous parallelism to state that the very opinion from which Supreme
Court review arose fit that paradigm, Judge Cooper actually departed
from practice as to that particular order; it reflects the stamp of her
own chambers, not of the parties.) Nonetheless, the fact remains that
many district court opinions, including other orders that the district
court entered in this very piece of litigation, are drafted by individuals
other than the judge whose signature appears at the end. We there-
fore see, at all levels, that a charge of reverse passing off theoretically
could be levied against the jurists who resolved the germinal case of
reverse passing off in the annals of our jurisprudence. 348
Is the circumstance that all three courts in Dastar v. Fox were not
themselves immune from charges of reverse passing off itself idiosyn-
cratic, somehow karmically induced by the overreaching claims of the
plaintiffs in this particular piece of litigation? 349 Hardly. Judges quot-
ing from briefs, clerks preparing opinions, parties drafting findings of
facts-these circumstances form the backbone of litigation in the fed-
eral courts.350 The matter has even drawn comment from the Ninth
Circuit in a copyright case.351
Moreover, the phenomenon of reverse passing off is scarcely lim-
ited to judicial opinions. Consider a few more instantiations.352
It is not only judges who affix their name to legal scholarship not
of their own composition. 353 The same applies to law profes-
sors3 5 4 and to senior partners at law firms.355
348. See Dursht, supra note 58, at 1253.
349. See supra note 234.
350. One commentator proposes amendments to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to re-
dress the situation. See Dursht, supra note 58, at 1253.
351. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 632-33 (9th Cir. 2003)
(Noonan, J., dissenting) ("The district court adopted eight of the plaintiffs' Findings of Fact on
fair use. Six are demonstrably wrong .... [T]he repeated errors committed by the district court
because of its reliance on the drafting of the plaintiffs relieve us of any duty to defer to the trial
judge.").
352. These considerations move me to part company with the proposal to create a "tort of
plagiarism per se." See Carolyn W. Davenport, Judicial Creation of the Prima Facie Tort of
Plagiarism in Furtherance of American Protection of Moral Rights, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 735
(1979).
353. Given the sensitivities in this domain, I should add that no research assistant assisted me
in this article. See Lerman, supra note 11, at 477 ("A scholar who delegates research or writing
to another person is delegating part of the thinking that should go into the production of scholar-
ship .... Many writers discover their thoughts about a topic by writing about the topic."). But I
have benefited from the research of librarian John Wilson and cribbed liberally from the Dastar
brief, as well as my previous treatise writing. See supra notes 46, 189.
354. "Some law professors use lengthy tracts written by their research assistants in their own
books or articles, representing that they wrote the works themselves." Lerman, supra note 11,
at 471. Note that that practice violates the strictures of the American Association of University
Professors. Id. at 473-74.
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* To put out videocassettes of Carmen Jones,356 credit might be
necessary to (quoting Justice Scalia's initial view of the matter)
Georges Bizet, Harry Belafonte and "the unknown Frenchman
who wrote the novel from whom Bizet got the idea. '357 Upon
further deliberation, one would need to add Prosper Merimde
and Oscar Hammerstein II to the list.358
* Justice Scalia likewise invoked during oral argument in Dastar v.
Fox the manufacture of "vise grips that you can have a pliers
that will hold on automatically until you release it" on which the
patent has expired, which he manufactures and sells under the
label "manufactured by Scalia. ' '359 That conduct should not be
considered to violate the rights of "Mr. Vise Grip ... the guy
that-that originally did it."'360
• I have discussed elsewhere why the claims of West Publishing
Company were rightly rejected in Bender v. West.3 6 1 At one
point, the company defended itself by claiming that it in fact ad-
ded emendations of its own invention into opinions that it pub-
lished under the names of the issuing judges (but without their
knowledge). 362 Given an aggressive implementation of reverse
passing off, its conduct would potentially have placed it afoul of
the Lanham Act.363
0 Imagine trying to craft a law that incorporates every credit re-
quirement. Hollywood guilds themselves cannot reach agree-
ment on all the open issues. Moreover, the same exercise would
need to unfold not only in the audiovisual realm, but elsewhere
as well. Consider, for example, its application to the simple act
of playing songs. Every time one is played on the radio, does the
obligation arise to give credit to the composer? And the lyricist?
355. An associate in a law firm may be enlisted by a partner to write or to co-author a
law review article on a topic of interest to the firm's clients. The article may be pub-
lished under the partner's name alone, even if the associate wrote the entire piece. The
"author" may write a footnote gratefully acknowledging the assistance of the associate
in preparing the article. These footnotes seldom include any information about what
were the respective roles of the partner and the associate in writing the article.
Id. at 470.
356. CARMEN JONES (Twentieth Century Fox 1954).
357. Those are the figures that Justice Scalia invoked at the hearing. Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment, supra note 257, at *35.
358. See supra text accompanying note 235. The same considerations would create a cause of
action against the University of Chicago Law Review for daring to trace "John Luther Long's
book, Madame Butterfly, made into a play by David Belasco, a libretto by G. Ricordi & Co., and
an opera by Giacomo Puccini." Dreyfuss, supra note 297, at 622 n.108 (emphasis added). In
fact, it was not a corporation that set Puccini's music to words-it was Giuseppe Giacosa and
Luigi Illica. See G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 470 (2d Cir. 1951).
359. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 257, at *24-25.
360. Id.
361. See Nimmer, supra note 12, at 95-115. Note that I acted as Bender's litigation counsel.
Id. at 43 n.165.
362. Id. at 101.
363. I am indebted to DePaul law student Jeremy Protas for spotting this point and calling it
to my attention after my presentation.
2004]
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How about the arranger; lead singer; guitarist; drummer; backup
vocalists; instrumentalists; and sound engineer? Moving beyond
radio, do the same considerations apply to music played on ele-
vators? 364 If so, far-reaching implications will follow. To cite
the simplest example, architects of skyscrapers would need to
include panels in elevators to display the copyright management
information encoded into the music piped into elevators. Such
information in turn would need to be supplied by those compa-
nies furnishing music, the whole functioning seamlessly together
to protect against the multiplication of still more lawsuits.
* Even at the apex of literature, the problem is only compounded.
Consider that one of the greatest poems in the English language
is T.S. Eliot's The Waste Land.365 Its section III, "The Fire Ser-
mon" contains the line "Sweet Thames, run softly till I end my
song."' 366 Given that the line does not emanate from something
as famous as Hamlet or Psalm 23, I could pass over the line with-
out remark. But wiser heads than mine have spotted that it de-
rives directly from Edmund Spenser's Prothalamion.367 What is
most salient for current purposes is that the great poet 368 in-
cluded it without attribution. His defenders take refuge in an
intent to create an "allusion" to works past. One could attempt
to justify the failure to set off that material with quotation marks
as being for "ironic relief. '369
Further rumination can cast reverse passing off as a fundamental 370
condition of literature 371 (and science), 372 going back from moder-
364. Now, make rules for attribution of usages of computer programs called up to view web
sites: famous paintings spoofed in editorial cartoons all the contributors to a television commer-
cial, which is itself a copyrightable composition. It is impossible to formulate general categories.
Broad legislation will create unlimited litigation.
365. The discussion below derives from Kevin J.H. Dettmar, The Illusion of Modernist Allu-
sion and the Politics of Postmodern Plagiarism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM, supra note 56,
at 99. "The body of the poem ... is a vertiginous melange of quotation, allusion, and 'original'
writing," reflecting "no small anxiety" about plagiarism and related concerns. Id. at 100-01.
366. T.S. ELIOT, THE WASTE LAND, § III (Barrons Educational Series 1969).
367. EDMUND SPENSER, PROTHALAMION & EPITHALAMION (Barbarian Press ed. 1998).
368. But not withal a great human being. See ANTHONY JULIUS, T.S. ELIOT: ANTI-SEMITISM
AND LITERARY FORM 1 (2003) (analyzing such passages as the following from T.S. Eliot's After
Strange Gods: "Reasons of race and religion combine to make any large number of free-thinking
Jews undesirable.").
369. Dettmar, supra note 365, at 100.
370. For a thousand delightful anecdotes on point, see generally LINDEY, supra note 46. One
such example occurred when a magazine editor recognized the submission of his own poem, and
responded to the "writer:"
I beg to acknowledge receipt of your verses, and to inform you that I have found them
admirable. I cannot praise them highly enough. Indeed, I liked them so well that I
wrote them myself two years ago.
Id. at 118-19.
371. "Media reports gleefully announce the discovery of plagiarism by public figures, writers,
historians, politicians: Martin Luther King, Alex Haley, Joe Biden, Bruno Bettelheim, Freud...
Martha Stewart .... Introduction to PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM, supra note 56, at xv. "The
notion of stealing ideas or words is not only modern, it is also profoundly Western. Students
[Vol. 54:1
2004] REVERSE PASSING OFF
nity373 past the Middle Ages3 74 to Greek literature,375 the New Testa-
ment,376 right back to the Bible 377 (not excluding the Torah itself).378
(It is, moreover, a constant source of anxiety even within literature. 379
As Philip Roth portrays a character named Philip Roth saying about a
character named Philip Roth: "In his pseudonymity is his anonymity,
and it's that anonymity that's killing me.") 380
from Middle Eastern, Asian, and African cultures are baffled by the notions that one can 'own'
ideas." C. Jan Swearingen, Originality, Authenticity, Imitation, and Plagiarism: Augustine's Chi-
nese Cousins, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM, supra note 56, at 19, 21.
372. See MARCEL C. LAFOLLETrE, STEALING INTO PRINT: FRAUD, PLAGIARISM, AND MIS-
CONDUCT IN SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING 48-61 (1992). Through efforts at combating plagiarism in
science, "it has been discovered that finding one definition of authorship acceptable to all institu-
tions and all disciplines is ... not just 'intellectually difficult,' but impossible." Id. at 91.
373. Voltaire noted "that plagiarism, even at its worst, 'est assurgment de tous les larcins le
moins dangereux pour la socigt6."' KAPLAN, supra note 177, at 78.
374. See Stearns, supra note 46, at 517 (Dante, Chaucer, Boccaccio); LINDEY, supra note 46,
at 15. Not even Leonardo da Vinci or Rembrandt are immune against such charges. See LAFOL-
LETrE, supra note 372, at 14, 99.
375. See LINDEY, supra note 46, at 64-65 (detailing charge of plagiarism composed by Aris-
tophanes against Aeschylus and Euripides); Marianina Olcott, Ancient and Modern Notions of
Plagiarism: A Study of Concepts of Intellectual Property in Classical Greece, 49 J. COPYRIGHT
SoC'Y 1047 (2002). The familiar verb klepto described that condition. Id. at 1048.
376. See James Thomas Zebroski, Intellectual Property, Authority, and Social Formation: Soci-
ohistoricist Perspectives on the Author Function, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM, supra note 56,
at 31, 33; JACK MILES, CHRIST: A CRISIS IN THE LIFE OF GOD 299 (2001).
377. Miles offers the insight, apropos of the absence of copyright protection in antiquity, id. at
319 n.4, that "[a]ttribution, under [those] circumstances, was a property of the text rather than an
indication that the text was the property of an author." Id. at 259. He adds that
if the great fault of postmodern criticism has been that, in effect, it treats all books as if
they were anonymously written, then this school of criticism may suit the Bible particu-
larly well, because so much of the Bible is irretrievably anonymous and the authorship
even of those portions of the Bible that bear some kind of attribution is quite often in
dispute.
Id. at 331 n.20.
378. According to one scholar, the book of Deuteronomy, through its attribution to Moses, is
an early example of reverse passing off. "The voice of the text belies its belatedness. By means
of it, the text's authors purchased a pedigree-both an antiquity and an authority-that the text
properly lacked. In so doing, they borrowed pseudepigraphically from the very textual authority
that they subverted." BERNARD M. LEVINSON, DEUTERONOMY AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF
LEGAL INNOVATION 6 (1997). For more on pseudepigraphy, see Sacha Stern, Attribution and
Authorship in the Babylonian Talmud, 45 J. JEWISH STUD. 28 (1994). See also infra text accom-
panying note 454.
379. A Pulitzer-winning novel, in this reader's eyes, rests on resistance to "the Tartarus of
pseudonymous hackdom," giving rise to a copyright infringement suit premised on the work-for-
hire doctrine. MICHAEL CHABON, THE AMAZING ADVENTURES OF KAVALIER AND CLAY 227,
282, 287-88, 494, 587-88 (2000). See supra note 291. That example is far from unique. See, e.g.,
MARTHA GRIMES, FOUL MATTER 360 (2003) ("rumors spread his wife really wrote his books");
id. at 208 (pseudonym).
380. PHILIP ROTH, OPERATION SHYLOCK 115 (1993). See id. at 66 (Jerusalem district judge
Dalia Dorner, who tried a celebrated copyright case involving the Dead Sea Scrolls, appears
anonymously.).
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C. Scenario 3: Plagiarism as an Academic Offense
The foregoing ruminations should not be taken as blanket conclu-
sions that reverse passing off is to be condoned. 381 Rather, they re-
flect the viewpoint that granting an unbounded cause of action to
redress its violation through court intervention poses a cure worse
than the disease. 382 Nonetheless, there remains one locale 383 where
the prohibition on reverse passing off serves an essential role, which
could legitimately arise to affect the legal rights of those caught within
its net. That domain is academe, with particular emphasis on the cus-
toms 3 8 4 of higher education.385
1.
Let us now depart from the label of "reverse passing off." As Das-
tar recognizes, that legal doctrine creates "a cause of action for, in
effect, plagiarism-the use of otherwise unprotected works and inven-
tions without attribution. ' 386 Within the academy, plagiarism contin-
381. One can find condemnation of reverse passing off in the strangest quarters. One English
professor quotes the "@nti-copyright" policies of the zines Aim Your Dick and Kablooie. See
Joan Livingston-Webber, GenX Occupies the Cultural Commons: Ethical Practices and Percep-
tions of Fair Use, in PERSPEcTIVES ON PLAGIARISM, supra note 56, at 263, 266. She quotes the
reservation of rights contained in the latter:
FUCK COPYRIGHTS. Plegm-Phlan and Beaver Storm deeply feel it is their obliga-
tion to convey important information to you. Whether this important information
comes from a published author or your pet goldfish doesn't matter a bit. If bureaucracy
did not exist and people could actually get things done, maybe these two editors would
meticulously contact each and every one of their sources. But probably not. If anyone
uses stuff from this particular zine, that's fine. Just don't say you wrote it. That's dumb.
Id. at 266. The most fascinating aspect of that diatribe is that the same authors who wish to
dynamite traditional copyright protection still adhere to the necessity of avoiding reverse passing
off ("Just don't say you wrote it."). Nonetheless, they do so not as a matter of legal postulation
but rather prudential condemnation ("That's dumb.").
382. Sadly, plagiarism remains ubiquitous, and only grows as a phenomenon with the advent
of the Internet. See, e.g., Anonymous, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Web: A
Cautionary Tale of Plagiarism, 93 LAW LIBR. J. 525, 526 (2001) ("The realization that this breach
of professional conduct had occurred was extremely upsetting, but the evidence was right there
on the Web. At the same time, I was appalled by such foolish risk taking. Plagiarism has ended
many an academic career. Why would an academic librarian take such a chance?"); NEIL HowE
& WILLIAM STRAUSS, MILLENIALS GO TO COLLEGE 120 (2003) ("special challenge ... to instill a
clear understanding of where originality and plagiarism begin and end"); ANN LATHROP &
KATHLEEN Foss, STUDENT CHEATING AND PLAGIARISM IN THE INTERNET ERA: A WAKE-UP
CALL 115-20 (2000).
383. As noted below, there are others as well. See infra text accompanying note 409 (example
of journalism).
384. As the histor puts it, in the unlikely context of the Indian custom of eating one's de-
ceased parents, "rightly Pindar seems to have composed when he said 'custom is the king of
all."' HERODOTUS, supra note 3, at 3.38, at 186.
385. See supra note 329.
386. Dastar v. Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 36 (2003).
REVERSE PASSING OFF
ues to amount to a serious infraction. As the hapless copyist in
Scenario Three learned, 387 plagiarism can be "a capital offense for law
students, 388 whether accompanied by prior warnings or not.
38 9 Of
what does this crime consist? Among the bewildering profusion of
characterizations, 390 the Modern Language Association has promul-
gated a widely quoted four-fold definition:
I. Plagiarism is the use of another person's ideas or expressions
in your writing without acknowledging the source.
II. Simply put, plagiarism is using another person's words or ideas
without appropriate acknowledgement.
III. In short, to plagiarize is to give the impression that you have
written or thought something that you have in fact borrowed
from someone else.
IV. [P]lagiarism is:
a. reproducing someone else's sentences more or less verba-
tim, and presenting them as your own;
b. repeating another's particularly apt phrase;
c. paraphrasing someone else's argument;
d. introducing another's line of thinking;
e. failing to cite the source for a borrowed thesis.
391
The contrast between university life and "civilian pursuits" should be
immediately apparent. 392 Copyright infringement never occurs, for in-
stance, when one copies another's idea 393 or even a brief phrase of
expression from a work still subject to copyright protection.394 Fur-
thermore, even copying the entirety of another's public domain ex-
pression-for example, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s The Path of the
Law, published in 1897-is analytically incapable of falling afoul of
copyright law. By contrast, a professor who published under his own
name all or part of The Path of the Law would be guilty of the most
387. See supra Part II.A.
388. Lerman, supra note 11, at 467. See Terri LeClercq, Failure to Teach: Due Process and
Law School Plagiarism, 49 J. LEGAL Enuc. 236, 246 (1999) (if unintentional, "may not warrant
an academic execution"); Dursht, supra note 58, at 1266-67.
389. K.R. ST. ONGE, THE MELANCHOLY ANATOMY OF PLAGIARISM 39 (1988) ("academic
capital offense, punishable by academic death for student or faculty. With or without
warnings.").
390. For a catalogue, see id. at 51-62. See also infra text accompanying note 407 (proposing
new definition).
391. ST. ONGE, supra note 389, at 54; Lerman, supra note 11, at 475; Dursht, supra note 58,
at 1260.
392. The rules of the Modern Language Association quoted above require attribution for
every thought, idea, and expression. It takes little imagination to realize that plaintiff Fox in the
Dastar case, along with every other Hollywood studio, would soon go bankrupt if faced with the
legal obligation, enforced at pain of litigation, to follow those strictures.
393. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
394. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2004) (copyright does not apply to short phrases).
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serious academic breach, potentially deserving termination. 395 In-
deed, if he purloined only an uncredited phrase or even idea, he
would find himself culpable for plagiarism under the definition just
quoted.396 By the same token, a student who submitted to her profes-
sor a paper setting forth verbatim, but under her own name,
paragraphs from The Path of the Law, would be subject to the full
disciplinary weight that the school could bring to bear.397
We now revert to Scenario Three, involving a challenge to 398 UCLA
Law School's discipline of a student who submitted a paper, allegedly
produced in haste, presenting as the writer's own work large portions
of prior scholarship. 399 The pattern itself is not uncommon 400 in the
academic context 401 and elsewhere. 402 Indeed, this pattern is some-
times embarrassingly common, particularly with the advent of cutting
and pasting facilitated by computer technology. 403 When the Univer-
sity of Oregon composed a student guide to plagiarism for distribution
to every incoming freshman, it was later nonplussed to learn that the
395. The rationale for punishment is to protect the institution. "The notion that punishment is
a cure for plagiarism is about as sound as the notion that punishment cures anything." ST.
ONGE, supra note 389, at 42. On the other hand, a different view is that one should educate
plagiarists instead of punishing them. See Candace Spigelman, The Ethics of Appropriation in
Peer Writing Groups, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM, supra note 56, at 231.
396. Taken literally, that conclusion leads to absurdity: "Explicit, full attribution of all sources
is impossible and not even desirable." ST. ONGE, supra note 389, at 49. "Indeed .... if we were
to comprehensively cite our sources, we would be involved in ... a 'full (and necessarily impossi-
ble) history of the writer's subjectivity.'" Howard, supra note 293, at 91.
397. The foregoing considerations amount to generalizations; it is not contended that this arti-
cle confronts every possible scenario of academic life. As has been observed, "It is treacherous,
even arrogant, to attempt to characterize the entire scholarly enterprise." ST. ONGE, supra note
389, at 25.
398. Note that the court case arose at a derivative level. In other words, when the student
submitted that plagiarized paper, he committed no legal offense. Rather, his violation of aca-
demic rules subjected him to university discipline. Later, the student sued UCLA in court,
claiming a violation of his rights of due process in those disciplinary proceedings.
399. Had the subject been not a paper but a comment in class, no discipline would have fol-
lowed. "'Oral plagiarism' is what many of us do most of the time because it is simply too labori-
ous to assemble 'references' even if we could recall them." ST. ONGE, supra note 389, at 59.
400. See Stearns, supra note 46, at 514, 532. See also supra note 11.
401. See Edward M. White, Student Plagiarism as an Institutional and Social Issue, in PERSPEC-
TIVES ON PLAGIARISM, supra note 56, at 205, 210 (recounting tale of author's "favorite plagia-
rist" who was too busy lecturing high school students on American values to write her own
papers). For a litigated case on the subject, see Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton University,
453 A.2d 263, 267 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (plaintiff submitted paper in which numerous
sections were taken verbatim from prior sources).
402. Amazingly, Benjamin Disraeli urged the exact same defense for having plagiarized from
Louis Adolphe Thiers when eulogizing the Duke of Wellington. LINDEY, supra note 46,
at 252-53.
403. See Zebroski, supra note 376, at 39 ("It is no chance that my advanced writing students
who plagiarized were all intensively into computers.") (emphasis in original).
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guide itself had been shamelessly plagiarized wholesale from Stanford
University's comparable manual.40 4 But the audacity of even that
gambit is beggared by the student at the University of Kent in Canter-
bury, who sued his university for negligence in failing to warn him
about the penalties for plagiarism.
40 5
Let us imagine for a moment that the student considered himself
T.S. Eliot's intellectual heir.40 6 When the professor pointed out that
the student's "original" paper consisted largely of unattributed quotes
to a prior article, the student would respond that it was a clever "allu-
sion." When pressed as to why he neglected to include quotation
marks to signal his intent, he would claim "for ironic effect!" Should
that defense protect the student from academic discipline? Scarcely.
It violates even the most narrow definition of plagiarism propounded
by one academic commentator who believes that the term has often
been too loosely defined: "Plagiarism is an intentional fraud commit-
ted by the psychologically competent that consists of copying signifi-
cant and substantial uncredited written materials for unearned
advantages with no significant enhancement of the materials
copied. "407
That definition does not purport to set forth the elements for a tort
at law. Rather, it expresses the "house rules" that certain guilds-
notably academics, but other domains as well 40 8 (journalism has at-
tracted a lot of publicity of late in that regard)4 9-have accepted
upon themselves. Those who cross the line risk not liability in court to
the general public, but rather being defrocked from the particular
priesthood which maintains its special rules. Even there, it leaves a
404. PETER W. MORGAN & GLENN H. REYNOLDS, A Plague of Originality, in THE APPEAR-
ANCE OF IMPROPRIETY: How THE ETHICS WARS HAVE UNDERMINED AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT, BUSINESS, AND SOCIETY, published in THE IDLER (Jan. 23, 2002), http://www.the-
idler.com/IDLER-02/1-23.html. As a consequence, the University of Oregon had to recall the
entire print-run, amounting to a delicious application of the droit de retrait. See supra
Part III.A.1.
405. BBC News, Plagiarist to Sue University, May 27, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
z/hi/uk news/education/3753065.stm ("I hold my hands up. I did plagiarise. I never dreamt it was
a problem.").
406. See supra text accompanying note 365.
407. ST. ONGE, supra note 389, at 101. If that definition, rather than section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, had been the touchstone for Dastar v. Fox, it is submitted that plaintiff's case still
would have foundered, inter alia, on the absence of proof that Dastar derived "unearned advan-
tages," i.e., benefits that would have been absent had it either omitted its own name or included
Fox's.
408. See, e.g., LAFOLLETrE, supra note 372, at 7-8 (recounting tale of Massachusetts' revoking
license of Jordanian doctor who engaged in notorious plagiarism of scientific articles).
409. See, e.g., John J. Goldman & Josh Getlin, The Nation; Reporter Fabricated, Plagiarized
Stories, N. Y. Times Says; Jayson Blair's Work Is a Huge Black Eye and an Abrogation of Trust,
the Paper's Publisher Says, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2003, at A36.
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great many sinners in holy orders-it is only in the extreme case of a
spectacular appropriation that a tenured professor will likely lose her
job (although one who habitually cribs from other's writings may, over
time, develop a deserved reputation for academic shoddiness). 410
2.
A great deal of thought has gone into the application of copyright
law to the specialized realm of academic life. Many commentators
champion the position that the efforts of professors should belong to
them personally. 411 Others take the view that, applying copyright
law's work-made-for-hire doctrine under its current interpretation,
the universities for which those professors work are the pertinent au-
thors under copyright law.412 The middle ground also enjoys some
theoretical support 41 3 (and may be the actual norm, according to em-
pirical research). 41 4 Some take the position that academic freedom
requires the normative conclusion that professors should enjoy copy-
410. See ST. ONGE, supra note 389, at 61 ("the mere charge of plagiarism can be and often is
as devastating as plagiarism proved. The label is the academic equivalent of the mark of Cain.").
411. See Laura G. Lape, Ownership of Copyrightable Works of University Professors: The In-
terplay Between the Copyright Act and University Copyright Policies, 37 VILL. L. REV. 223,
240-46 (1992). For the argument that the Constitution mandates that result, see Pamela A.
Kilby, The Discouragement of Learning: Scholarship Made for Hire, 21 J.C. & U.L. 455 (1995).
412. Todd F. Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They "Works Made for Hire" Under the 1976 Copy-
right Act?, 9 J.C. & U.L. 485 (1983); Leonard D. DuBoff, An Academic's Copyright: Publish and
Perish, 32 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 17 (1984); Sandip H. Patel, Note, Graduate Students' Ownership
and Attribution Rights in Intellectual Property, 71 IND. L.J. 481, 500 (1996). Patel's note champi-
ons the position that graduate students, by contrast, have not given up copyright ownership. Id.
at 502-12. The fact that professors habitually commit reverse passing off as to the works of their
graduate students has often been noted. See LINDEY, supra note 46, at 117-18.
In at least one instance, a university's assertion of ownership over a computer program devel-
oped by its professor stymied the work's coming into fruition. See Dreyfuss, supra note 297, at
616. It seems doubtful, however, that universities would generally be in a position to monitor
the development of articles, monographs, and other scholarly products on a daily basis such as to
be in a position to even begin an analysis, contrary to the professor's desire, about when to
release it into circulation.
413. "[T]here are reasons why it may be unwise to allow either schools or the teachers to
secure absolute copyright ownership in educational materials." Russ VerSteeg, Copyright and
the Educational Process: The Right of Teacher Inception, 75 IOWA L. REV. 381, 409, 411 (1990)
(proposing "shop right" modeled on patent law). See Michele J. Le Moal-Gray, Distance Educa-
tion and Intellectual Property: The Realities of Copyright Law and the Culture of Higher Educa-
tion, 16 TouRo L. REV. 981, 1021 (2000). One commentator proposes a "principle of
proportionality," while conceding that "the devil in a proposal like this one is in its details."
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and Ac-
countability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1220-22 (2000).
414. See Ashley Packard, Copyright or Copy Wrong: An Analysis of University Claims to
Faculty Work, 7 COMM. L. & POL'Y 275, 293-308 (2002) (discussing joint owners, co-owners,
royalty-free licenses, and sharing percentage of royalties); Lape, supra note 411, at 261.
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right ownership;415 others derive the same conclusion from the allied
vantage point of the First Amendment. 416
Concern over the issue of academic copyrights has not been limited
to scholarly journals. This issue occupied a 1975 hearing before Con-
gress.417 The larger issue on the table at that hearing was the advent
of photocopying machines and what effect they were exerting on
copyright owners. Of particular concern to the witnesses gathered on
that day was the impact of photocopying on scholarly journals, and
whether the one would lead to the extinction of the other.
418
One learns when reviewing the transcript about something called
"page charges." At issue with "page charges" is a counter-intuitive
concept: instead of paying an author for publication rights, the pub-
lisher charges the author for the privilege of being published! 419 The
testimony from thirty years ago indicated that those charges were es-
sential to subvent the costs of specialized journals. Such charges were
widespread in the sciences, and averaged about forty dollars per page
at that juncture.420
Of course, that was then. Today, by contrast, we live in the Internet
age, meaning that everything has changed. Electronic publishing is
now cheap-after all, one need simply take a digitized file, upload it,
and Voild!-you have a published work accessible immediately to
scholars everywhere, with no need to shoot ink onto "tree flakes en-
415. See Packard, supra note 414, at 289-93 (reluctantly concluding nonetheless that, under
"logical inconsistency" in United States Supreme Court line of cases, professors would lose this
claim, as academic freedom has been interpreted to belong to universities, rather than individual
professors). If universities were going to assert copyright ownership as a means of controlling
dissemination of professors' products, that fear would mature. In fact, however, "[t]he university
has little to gain by claiming aspects of the copyright in which it has no real interest." Lape,
supra note 411, at 265. See also supra note 412.
416. See Kilby, supra note 411, at 460-61, 475 ("[Tjhe right to prevent publication of contro-
versial works could be a more potent (and less costly) weapon against unorthodox views than
outright dismissal of a tenured professor.").
417. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary (May 14, 1975).
418. The concern is perennial. See NIMMER, supra note 154, at 8-9.
419. MR. DANIELSON. Will someone give me a very concise definition of "page
charges", what are they, and who pays them to whom?
MRS. ADAMS. Authors pay publishers of scientific and technical journals. These
charges are based on the length of the article.
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, supra note 417, at 199. See id. at 235 (" 'Page charges' are an accept-
ance of the philosophy that 'authors' (or their employers) must share in the funding of the com-
munication process, and that publication of findings is the final step in the completion of a
significant study.").
420. Id. at 250 (twenty to fifty dollars range as of 1962-1964).
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cased in dead cow." 421 Today, therefore, one can reason that there is
no need for something as quaint as "page charges."
But, one would be wrong. The lesson that emerges from following
the heritage bequeathed by Herodotus is that the past stays with us. 422
Someone who surfs the Web today searching for the term "page
charges" will promptly learn, for example, that the American Astro-
physical Society's Astronomical Journal as of 2004 imposes charges of
one hundred fifty dollars per page. 423
In that light, it is fascinating to revisit the issue of whether articles
submitted for publication by various professors constitute works-
made-for-hire. Perhaps we would determine that the "pro-professor"
viewpoint in the debate is to conclude that the university owns the
copyright; in that way, the institution rather than the individual would
be saddled with payment of the appropriate "page charges!"
In truth, however, these are sideline issues compared to the issues
of true import to the Academy. The issue is not who pays for or gains
royalties for academic publication. Instead, economics are secondary
here-the true issue instead is who gets credit.424 If Larry Lessig, for
instance, writes an article for the Duke Law Journal, nobody actually
pays page charges. 425 He makes no money from it, and neither does
his home institution, Stanford Law School.
The confluence of circumstances at issue here brings us back to
Demaratus' association of the Greeks' poverty with their intelligence
and the force of law.426 The mandarin class which has chosen to staff
law schools has, as a group, largely decided to foreswear the remuner-
ation of fancy law practices in favor of "the subtle power of a post-
421. NIMMER, supra note 154, at 8 (quoting MIT Dean William Mitchell).
422. See supra Part II.B.
423. See THE ASTRONOMICAL JOURNAL, available at http://www.astro.washington.edu/astroj/
charges.html (last visited June 5, 2004). The Publication Agreement propounded by the Society
also provides as follows: "Because the American Astronomical Society (Society), acting through
the University of Chicago Press, is undertaking to publish this paper, and because you desire to
have this paper so published, you grant and assign the entire copyright for this paper exclusively
to the Society." In addition, it goes on to specify: "It is understood that you will receive no
monetary compensation from the Society for the assignment of copyright and publication of the
paper." American Astronomical Society, Publication Agreement, available at http://
www.journals.uchicago.edu/ApJ/ApJSPubAgree.pdf (last visited June 5, 2004).
424. In the academic context, the apergu holds that "it is largely by knowing to whom to
attribute inferior (and superior) work that society motivates creators to do their best." Dreyfuss,
supra note 297, at 606. As to the Dastars and Foxes of the world, by contrast, it is the difference
in price point that is decisive. See Dastar v. Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 27 (2003) ("Dastar sells its Cam-
paigns videos to Sam's Club, Costco, Best Buy, and other retailers and mail-order companies for
$25 per set, substantially less than New Line's video set.").
425. See Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1783 (2002).
426. See supra Part II.B. •
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poned power. ' 427 As a rule, they prefer to be known as 61ite shapers
of the law rather than for selling as many units as John Grisham and
Stephen King.
Far more threatening to the m6tier of this class than divesting eco-
nomic rights into their employers under the work-made-for-hire doc-
trine would be to vest exclusive attribution in the employers.
Consider that Atari some years ago decided to list its corporate name
as author, rather than crediting individual programmers. 428 If Stan-
ford Law School were to adopt the same expedient, such that a given
article that appears in the Duke Law Journal would not reveal
whether it was authored by Larry Lessig, Margaret Radin, Paul Gold-
stein, or Kathleen Sullivan, we might, indeed, have a revolution on
our hands.
3.
What features justify the disparate treatment charted above be-
tween professors (and reporters), on the one hand, and the general
public facing liability in courts of law, on the other? At this point, we
must recall that works protected by copyright command protection at
their inception not only for all of the rights secured by Title 17 of the
United States Code, but also with every species of moral rights that a
French poet could desire.429 Moreover, with the United States Su-
preme Court's validation of extended copyright terms,430 those pro-
tections can last more than a century.431 Only when the author has
voluntarily parted with copyright ownership can those rights be dimin-
ished.432 Moreover, even as to authors who have licensed their works,
and even as to works that have entered the public domain, they still
have the right to prevent passing off through unauthorized use of their
name.
4 33
427. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 32 (1920).
428. Dreyfuss, supra note 297, at 621 & n.104.
429. See supra Part III.C.2.a.
430. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
431. As to works published before 1978, their copyrights can last for up to ninety-five years.
17 U.S.C. § 304 (2000). As to works created thereafter, their duration exceeds a century when at
least one co-author lives for three decades after the work's creation. Id. § 302(b) ("70 years after
such last surviving author's death").
432. Absent such antecedent act by the author, the Copyright Act forbids expropriation, ex-
cept in the case of bankruptcy. Id. § 201(e). See also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 46,
§ 10.04.
433. For instance, even after John Grisham has licensed his whole oeuvre to a publishing
house, he can still prevent it from presenting the work of another (from Herodotus to Martha
Grimes) under the name "John Grisham." As set forth above, "[it would constitute the tort of
passing off for Harper & Row, for instance, to reissue A Time to Heal under the name Stephen
King in order to boost sales." See supra text accompanying note 92.
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But to go further and allow authors-those whose works have en-
tered the public domain, for example (as occurred in Dastar v. Fox)-
to demand forever that their name accompany what they view as ele-
ments of their creation lawfully purveyed by a third party is to invite
the Catch-22 situation, whereby the public domain is effectively evis-
cerated. 434 Nonetheless, the same insistence that would threaten a liti-
gation donnybrook when wielded by the Foxes of the world need
cause little concern in the university context. The distinction arises
because professors who offer articles and other scholarly contribu-
tions seeking to further the progress of knowledge are largely immune
from the market forces that constrain the Dastars of the world. 435
Whereas the manufacturer of a videocassette or an audio-CD must
contend with the limited amount of space on a J-card or on the
outside packaging, and is guided by marketing considerations and the
overwhelming need to attract customer interest, those limitations are
by and large alien to the academic environment. No space limitations
prevent them from citing to past sources; indeed, failure to cite is the
pitfall here, as it threatens to sacrifice the scholar's credibility. 436 Nor
do professors face the Catch-22 that their citation to sources past will
itself give rise to a claim for passing off.
At base, the different currency of the Academy accounts for the
different regime that should govern it.437 The laws of the marketplace
are ill served by allowing authors who no longer enjoy copyright pro-
tection to assert ersatz ownership through the vehicle of reverse pass-
ing off. The marketplace operates through the lifeblood of sales
volume and mass circulation. 438 The Academy operates on a different
434. See supra note 232.
435. This is not to deny that researchers act in the context of different "market" forces-the
pressure to attract grant funding, or to secure academic advancement, to name but two. The
point is that those considerations differ in kind from the ones to be cited in the text momentarily.
436. See Steve Nimis, Fussnoten: Das Fundament der Wissenschaft, 17 ARETHUSA 105, 105
(1984).
437. "Ideas, research, and writing are the currency of academe. Originality of written work is
essential to the integrity of the academic system. A professor who claims the work of another as
his own-even if it is only part of an article-is engaged in academic fraud." Lerman, supra note
11, at 477-78. "The whole world might play this fraudulent game, but when it is played in an
academy dedicated to truth, knowledge and principles, the offense is a mortal wound to the
intellectual enterprise." Dursht, supra note 58, at 1296. See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, supra
note 417, at 233 ("These scholars are rarely concerned with private income from their published
papers"); id. at 251 ("MR. DANIELSON. What does the author of these articles derive in the way
of monetary or other valuable considerations? MR. LIEB. He gets fame and prestige.").
438. Of course, one can read the testimony of artists who explain that "the real and most
important reason for our obsession with perfection is in our pride. These are our names out
there for everyone to see and judge." Kwall, supra note 48, at 16 (quoting director Milos For-
man). Nonetheless, in the same breath, even those artists must concede that "the financial in-
centive of our rewards is important" as well. Id. (quoting director Milos Forman).
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currency,439 namely proper attribution.440 Scholarly articles are not
composed in order to generate author royalties and thereby amortize
costs over the projected life of the copyright 441 with an allowance for
the necessary profits in order to warrant the initial investment in pub-
lishing them.442 Rather, the entire incentive for their creation is (from
the celestial perspective) 443 to advance the frontiers of human knowl-
edge and (from the earthly vantage) 444 to win their authors recogni-
tion. 445 The right of attribution here is not an afterthought that
threatens to skew the basic incentives; in the academic context, it IS
the incentive (or a large part of it) which therefore must enjoy protec-
439. It is conceded that different considerations may apply to the realm of software and gen-
erally to patents. See Patel, supra note 412, at 484 n.7 (Gatorade has brought the University of
Florida $21 million since its invention by faculty members; other technologies have earned their
universities far more.).
440. It would be manifestly false to contend that professors crave recognition and artists do
not. See, e.g., Lacey, supra note 65, at 1574-75 ("most artists work for a variety of motives.
Many work for fame or recognition among their peers."). It would be equally false to contend
that one group cares about money and the other does not. Id. at 1574 ("I do not mean to imply
that money is not important to artists."). The point, instead, is that novelists, screenwriters,
composers, painters, sculptors, and most other types of artists operate in an environment in
which their works can ultimately find success in the marketplace. By contrast, articles in law
journals, for example, regardless of how much celebrity they achieve, never generate any royal-
ties to the professors who author them. Still, as with all aspects of life, the divisions are not
hermetic. It cannot be denied that there is a marketplace for scholarly books, which can prove
as lucrative (or as heartless) as the one in which sculptors and composers operate.
441. Quite to the contrary, one view labels them "the hypertrophic byproducts of the tenure
process." Julie Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Man-
agement," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 520 (1998).
442. "As the University of Chicago Copyright Policy points out, traditional scholarly works,
on the whole, have never been particularly profitable. The expense of trying to manage all of the
scholarly articles, monographs and academic books produced every year by faculty would likely
outweigh any profit that could be made from them." Packard, supra note 414, at 306 (footnote
omitted).
443. One commentator calls professors "those who are primarily entrusted with advancing
knowledge in our society." Kilby, supra note 411, at 485.
444. Of course, the two perspectives work in tandem. On October 25, 1994, Prof. Andrew
Wiles electrified the mathematical world with his solution to the centuries-old mystery of
Fermat's Last Theorem. Although he did not thereby succeed to a copyright, he did obtain what
few authors get: an offer from The Gap to model its jeans! See PAUL HOFFMAN, THE MAN WHO
LOVED ONLY NUMBERS 184 (1998); Nimmer, supra note 12, at 27-28.
445. From the lyric poem to the scientific footnote, the printed word is the writer's
means of proving and perpetuating his existence. That identity of self and work, and
the prospect for continuation, are more precious to him than the promiscuous coin of
the realm.
MALLON, supra note 46, at 236-37. "In publications such as scholarly journals, the only compen-
sation authors receive is the satisfaction of seeing their work in print, and having their names
seen by others." Dursht, supra note 58, at 1266. See EUGENE VOLOKH, ACADEMIC LEGAL
WRITING: LAW REVIEW ARTICLES, STUDENT NOTES, AND SEMINAR PAPERS 155 (2003) ("There's
nothing wrong with a lawyer copying language from an earlier brief written by other lawyers at
the same firm .... But the rules in scholarly writing are more demanding.) (emphasis in original).
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tion for the enterprise to continue sensibly.446 "Citing is paying" in
this environment. 447 Here, derogation of moral rights, which else-
where mean something other than morality, 448 attests to a defect in
moral character. 449
This distinction also explains why the academic tort of plagiarism 450
arises independently of copyright subsistence. Whether a scholar in
2004 dishonestly attaches his name to writings of the distant past or of
last week, the offense does not differ in kind. In either event, he is
polluting the cognitive well and disgracing his professional obligations
by claiming credit where it is not due.451 Plagiarism goes to the heart
of the academic enterprise in a way that reverse passing off cannot
affect the commercial marketplace. 452 For that reason, plagiarism is
and should remain a serious dereliction pursuant to the "House
Rules" that govern in the university setting.453
446. In the academic setting, "attribution may be more important than the right to control
commercial control." Kwall, supra note 138, at 63 (quoting Mark Lemley, Rights of Attribution
and Integrity in Online Communications, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 2, para. 11). See Stearns, supra
note 46, at 529 ("In noncommercial publications, such as scholarly or scientific journals, seeing
their names in print-and having their names seen by others-is the only compensation authors
receive.").
447. Alice M. Roy, Whose Words These Are I Think I Know: Plagiarism, the Postmodern, and
Faculty Attitudes, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM, supra note 56, at 55, 58; LAFOLLETIE, supra
note 372, at 51-52 ("Citations are the currency by which we repay the intellectual debt we owe
to our predecessors."). "Scholarly citations, then, the means by which scholars establish their
'credibility' and 'give credit,' play an important role in the production and circulation of intellec-
tual capital in their disciplinary economies." Shirley K. Rose, The Role of Scholarly Citations in
Disciplinary Economies, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM, supra note 56, at 241-42.
448. See supra text accompanying note 48.
449. See Le Clercq, supra note 388, at 243; David Leight, Plagiarism as Metaphor, in PERSPEC-
TIVES ON PLAGIARISM, supra note 56, at 221, 223.
450. Admittedly, an accusation of plagiarism can wound even outside of academia. See, e.g.,
GRIMES, supra note 379, at 165 (framing author for plagiarism is one small step short of killing
him).
451. "For academic people, protecting the integrity of the intellectual record, the stream of
scholarly output over the year, is a Big Deal, as professionally important as protecting the integ-
rity of the blood supply is to the Red Cross." Le Clercq, supra note 388, at 250.
452. It is possible that a professor might also earn from an article some undeserved income
that would not have accrued had he given proper credit to predecessors, and thus have alerted
the journal that his contribution does not qualify as the scholarly contribution it was cracked up
to be. But that state of affairs is simply incidental. By contrast, the essence of Dastar's goal was
not to get credit for originating the subject material, but rather to maximize its profits by selling
as much product as possible. In that context, it would presumably have been willing to forego
naming itself as originator of the videotape, or using any other name that would increase sales
(but not wrongly claiming that its product was manufactured by Fox, as that course of action
would constitute wrongful passing off). In other words, in the marketplace, the attribution is as
peripheral as it is central to the academic project.
453. Prof. Kwall makes an impassioned plea that "universities have special responsibilities to
safeguard the moral rights of authors operating within their creative environments." Kwall,
supra note 138, at 79-81. I share her assessment. My own is that rather than altering the laws
REVERSE PASSING OFF
Thus ends our inquiry into plagiarism. It can now be seen as a sub-
set of pseudepigraphy, which refers generally to a fictitious and unsub-
stantiated attribution of a work.454 But whereas pseudepigraphy in
ages past typically consisted of taking a newly composed work and
fictitiously attributing it to an ancient character in order to give it a
more illustrious pedigree,455 modern plagiarism, in the academic con-
text, consists of the opposite-taking an old work and fictitiously at-
tributing it to a modern person in order to bolster his reputation. 456
Thus viewed, the offense is as venal as it is dishonest-something that
self-respecting institutions devoted to higher education should not
tolerate.
V. MORAL
In sum, there is in the United States, and there should continue to
be, a moral right against passing off. As a general matter, by contrast,
the reverse should be limited to specialized settings, such as academe,
where attribution lies at the core of the raison d'etre for the creation
of works. But in the general marketplace, where works are produced
and vended for reasons independent of their attribution, the Supreme
Court in Dastar v. Fox ruled wisely in denying the existence of a gen-
eral tort of reverse passing off regarding claims of origin for works of
authorship.
passed by Congress or state legislatures, the answer should be internal to the academic setting by
the adoption of appropriate university policies, ratified by their respective academic senates, for
application to professors and students alike.
454. See Stern, supra note 378, at 38.
455. Id. at 44. See Levinson, supra note 378, at 6.
456. See, e.g., supra note 319.
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